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“It is a melancholy reflection that what is of the most universal importance, is most universally 
neglected – I mean keeping up the credit of money.” 
- Dr. Albigence Waldo  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
            On June 8, 1783, George Washington, the Commander in Chief of the Continental Army, 
sent a letter to all state legislatures of the United States regarding the matters facing the new nation. 
Since 1775, Washington had managed the strategic operations of the Continental Army through 
“many anxious days and watchful nights.”1 Prior to entering a “state of undisturbed repose,” 
Washington offered his perspectives to all citizens on important issues pertaining to the 
“tranquility of the United States.”2 While the United States won the War of Independence, 
Washington believed that domestic instabilities remained a pressing conundrum for state 
legislators. Ultimately, Washington realized that some state legislators were reluctant to fully 
capitulate to the authority of the Continental Congress. Washington believed that if state 
legislatures did not delegate power to Congress, the perpetual union would succumb to “Anarchy 
and confusion,” and would fail to “regulate and govern the general concerns of the Confederated 
Republic.”3 In effect, Washington believed that this union would allow the United States to remain 
an independent nation. 
            Washington concluded that a permanent union between the state legislatures and Congress 
would thwart political corruption, and would maintain the independency of America. Through this 
 
1 “Washington’s Circular Letter of Farwell to the Army, June 8, 1783,” Library of Congress, 
www.loc.gov/teachers/classroommaterials/presentationsandactivities/presentations/timeline/amrev/peace 
/circular.html (accessed August 30, 2017). 
 
2 Ibid. 
 
3 Ibid. 
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indissoluble merger, Washington also believed that the country would be able to serve the public 
by resolving the country’s debts to domestic and foreign creditors, and “earnestly inculcate” 
economic stability among all citizens. After serving the public in a military capacity, Washington 
argued that state legislators must properly recompense soldiers for their valor, and repay creditors 
for their altruism. He referred to these public compensations as a “debt of honor and of gratitude” 
that would allow these public servants to “reap the fruit of his labours.” Specifically, Washington 
asserted that Congress’ reluctance to recompense soldiers for their service cheated the 
Continentals. Although state legislatures struggled to repay public creditors due to the limited 
supply of monetary reserves, Washington viewed Congress’ unwillingness to allocate annual 
payments to soldiers, especially Continental officers, as a disgrace.4 During the war, citizens and 
legislators constantly debated the issuance of service pensions. The discourse was especially 
acrimonious in Connecticut. For example, three of Connecticut’s Congressional delegates, Roger 
Sherman, Samuel Huntington, and Oliver Wolcott, provided their united opinion on the question 
of service entitlements to Governor Jonathan Trumbull. On May 18, 1778, the Connecticut 
delegates wrote a letter to Governor Trumbull noting that disagreement over the institution of 
service pensions was “the most painful and disagreeable question that hath ever been agitated in 
Congress.”5 Sherman, Huntington, and Wolcott’s letter suggested that legislators were more 
concerned with recompensing public creditors and controlling debt, than dispensing entitlements 
to soldiers. Yet, Washington insisted that service pensions would prevent a “total dereliction of 
the Service.”6 Regardless of whether or not Congress believed that service gratuities were odious 
 
4 “Washington’s Circular Letter of Farwell to the Army, June 8, 1783,” Library of Congress. 
 
5 “The Connecticut Delegates to the Governor of Connecticut (Jonathan Trumbull), May 18, 1778,” in 
Letters of Members of the Continental Congress, ed. Edmund C. Burnett, Volume III, (Washington, D.C.: The 
Carnegie Institution of Washington), 1926, 255-256. 
 
6 “Washington’s Circular Letter of Farwell to the Army, June 8, 1783,” Library of Congress. 
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in that it added to the public debt, Washington maintained that soldiers’ service pensions were 
analogous to “the price of their blood and of your independency.”7  
            Although Washington’s 1783 circular letter to the state legislatures declared that while he 
supported service pensions, he also advocated against this entitlement during the war. In November 
1777, Washington noted in his personal writings that service entitlements would be 
“impracticable.”8 Despite a surge in desertions, and a clear decline in a number of Continentals’ 
morale during the winter of 1778, Washington justified his stance by recording the potential 
reactions of ordinary people, as well as the impact service gratuities would have on the country’s 
debt. In terms of public backlash, Washington believed that service entitlements would create 
perpetual dissentions between civilians and Continental volunteers. As Marjoleine Kars argues, 
ordinary colonists who sought economic autonomy, and resisted imperial oppression, fueled the 
Revolutionary War. While the Crown continued to implement oppressive policies among the 
American Colonies, middling colonists rebelled against impartial local governments, and 
excessive taxation.9 Washington feared that if Congress were to authorize service remunerations 
to all soldiers, payments would eventually create a partial social distinction between Continentals 
and commoners, who resisted imperial tyranny through local militia groups and committees of 
safety. In terms of the country’s deficit, Washington deemed service entitlements as another 
 
7 “Washington’s Circular Letter of Farwell to the Army, June 8, 1783,” Library of Congress. 
 
8 “Remarks on Plan of Field Officers for Remodeling the Army, November 1777,” in The Writings of 
George Washington, ed. John C. Fitzpatrick, Hathi Trust Digital, Volume 10, October 1933, (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office), 126, https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=msu.31293001055601;view=1up;seq= 
189 (accessed November 3, 2017). 
 
9 Marjoleine Kars, Breaking Loose Together: The Regulator Rebellion in Pre-Revolutionary North 
Carolina (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press), 2002, 6. 
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expenditure that would “sink the Colonies under the load of it.”10 In an effort to balk popular 
uproar, as well as thwart further economic stagnation, Washington initially opposed service 
gratuities for Continentals. 
            The evolution in Washington’s stance toward service entitlements altered through his 
leadership of the Continental Army, as well as his experience in dealing with a growing sense of 
disobedience among Continental regiments. In January 1778, a committee on Army affairs for the 
Continental Congress proposed the ratification of an entitlement legislation that sought to 
remunerate all Continental officers, who served till the end of the war, with half-pay for life.11 In 
a letter to Henry Laurens, the fifth President of the Continental Congress, Washington argued that 
half-pay pensions would lead to the “salvation of the cause.”12 Washington suggested that if the 
Continental Congress authorized an entitlement program that provided financial security to 
officers, it would enable these Continentals to secure economic opportunity following the war, 
thus maintaining the health of the union. Despite Washington’s idyllic view toward lifelong service 
payments for officers, political opposition remained strong. For example, Laurens believed that 
half-pay pensions would lead to larger taxes on the citizenry in order to pay for this social 
expenditure, and would virtually create an officer corps aristocracy.13 As opposition continued in 
 
10 “Remarks on Plan of Field Officers for Remodeling the Army, November 1777,” in The Writings of 
George Washington, ed. John C. Fitzpatrick, 126. 
 
11 William H. Glasson, Federal Military Pensions in the United States, ed. David Kinley, (New York: 
Oxford University Press), 1918, 25. 
 
12 “From George Washington to Henry Laurens, 10 April 1778,” Founders Online, National Archives, last 
modified February 1, 2018, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-14-02-0430 (accessed February 
2, 2018). 
 
13 “Henry Laurens to William Livingston, April 19, 1778,” in Letters of Members of the Continental 
Congress, ed. Edmund C. Burnett, Volume III, (Washington, D.C.: The Carnegie Institution of Washington), 1926, 
176-178.  
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Congress, many Continental officers feared that their service pensions would never become 
legitimate. In December 1782, an officer corps stationed in Newburgh, New York sent a memorial 
to Congressional delegates insisting that entitlements were an “honorable and just recompense for 
several years hard service.”14 In the same token, Henry Knox, Jedidiah Huntington, among other 
commanders of the Connecticut Line argued that “any further experiments,” that attempted to 
hesitantly compensate the impatient officers, could lead to “fatal effects.”15 As delegates failed to 
construct entitlement legislation, the Newburgh officers’ address seemed more like a threat to the 
Continental Congress. Because Congress hesitated to authorize life pensions for officers, some 
delegates believed that a military coup d’état was foreseeable. As talks of peace emerged with the 
Crown, Congress reluctantly passed the Commutation Act on March 22, 1783 that sought to 
provide five years payment, in money or securities, to all Continental officers.16 Washington’s 
eventual support of service entitlements arose out of sympathy toward the fact that soldiers’ 
financial security remained dubious following the war, and an effort to prevent a military threat on 
Congressional delegates. 
            While Washington’s eventual support of service pensions gave officers a sense of 
assurance following the war, an economic downturn undermined the Commutation Act. High 
taxes, coupled with the injustices of service entitlements, led to unrelenting public outrage. 
Specifically, service pension protestors in Farmington, Connecticut believed that the Commutation 
Act reduced the regular standing army, and commoners, to a subservient level against officers. In 
 
14 “The Address and Petition of the Officers of the Army of the United States, December 1782,” in Journals 
of the Continental Congress 1774-1789, ed. Gaillard Hunt, Library of Congress, Volume XXIV, (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office), 1922, 291-292.   
 
15 Ibid. 
 
16 Laura Jensen, Patriots, Settlers, and the Origins of American Social Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press), 2003, 60. 
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order to procure Commutation payments, state legislatures were forced to increase taxes. As 
money remained scarce, ordinary Americans fell deeper into impoverishment, and dissenters 
believed that the entitlement statute gave officers an unfair social distinction among Continental 
privates, and militia volunteers.17 By 1790, Congress’s entitlement legislation failed due to 
opposition from ordinary Americans and state legislators, as well as the lack of monetary reserves 
to recompense officers. However, contentions over social standing remained at the forefront of 
service entitlements.18 The evidence of rationing martial goods for impoverished soldiers, and 
discrepancies in soldiers’ compensation records reveals that the social and wealth distribution of 
the Connecticut Line was diverse. Social historians of the Revolutionary War interpret the social 
and economic composition of the Continental Army in a variety of ways. While some insist that 
the majority of soldiers came from elite landholding backgrounds, other historians assert that there 
were far less soldiers from prominent Anglo-American families based on tax assessment data.  
            Although there has not been a comprehensive analysis on the social and wealth distribution 
of the Connecticut Line, a number of historians have examined the stark social and economic 
divisions within different states’ regiments legitimized by the Continental Congress. Mark E. 
Lender argues that the officer corps for the New Jersey Line predominately hailed from elite 
landholding families in America. According to Lender, “fully 84 percent of the New Jersey officers 
came from the wealthiest third of the state’s population.”19 In addition, Lender asserts that nearly 
 
17 Solomon Whitman, “At a Meeting of the Inhabitants of the Town of Farmington, on the Fourth Day of 
August, 1783,” Connecticut Courant, August 12, 1783, http://infoweb.newsbank.com.providence.idm.oclc.org 
(accessed October 5, 2017).   
 
18 Jensen, 62. 
 
19 Mark E. Lender, “The Enlisted Line: The Continental Soldiers of New Jersey,” (Ph.D. dissertation, 
Rutgers University, 1975), 128-129. 
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a third of the continental officers were from the state’s “richest tenth,” and represented the “flower 
of society.” 20 Furthermore, Lender claims that none of the New Jersey officers came from lower-
tier segments of New Jersey’s population. A number of historians, such as James Kirby Martin, 
and Ray Raphael, incorporated Lender’s analysis on the Continental Army’s officer corps into 
their own scholarly work. Raphael asserts that “with the exception of the officers, most of the long-
term soldiers were boys and men of little wealth.”21 In addition, Lender collaborated with James 
Kirby Martin in a 2006 book entitled, A Respectable Army: The Military Origins of the Republic, 
1763 – 1789, that includes tax and property wealth data from Lender’s dissertation. Ultimately, 
Lender and Martin assert that “overall [the officers] were no different in socioeconomic 
composition and personal accomplishments than their fellow Revolutionaries in state legislatures 
and Congress.”22 Lender, Martin, and Raphael argue that the majority of officers were members 
of America’s social elite. 
            Charles Royster, on the other hand, places a greater emphasis on the wealth variance in the 
Continental Army. Royster describes the role of enrollment requirements for rising officers from 
middling backgrounds. According to Royster, the ability of colonists to raise a company of soldiers 
provided an avenue for higher status, despite their humble origins.23 Furthermore, he asserts that 
 
20 Lender, “The Enlisted Line,” 128-129. 
 
21 Ray Raphael, A People’s History of the American Revolution: How Common People Shaped the Fight 
for Independence (New York: Perennial), 2002, 82.  
 
22 James Kirby Martin and Mark E. Lender, A Respectable Army: The Military Origins of the Republic, 
1763 – 1789, 2nd ed. (Wheeling, Illinois: Harlan Davidson, 2006), 108. 
 
23 Charles Royster, A Revolutionary People at War: The Continental Army and American Character, 1775 
– 1783 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press), 1979, 64. Royster incorporates a passage from the 
memoirs of John Lacey, a Brigadier-General in the Pennsylvania militia, to argue that the majority of officers were 
not from affluent origins. Lacey acknowledged that the majority of his fellow officers were “Sons of Farmers or 
Mechaniks, who had quit the Plow or the Workshop (Royster, A Revolutionary People at War, 87). 
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if working class men fulfilled the Continental Army’s enrollment requirements, these men could 
encourage their neighbors to join their companies, and secure their posts as officers. Royster 
concludes that the social and economic status of the rank-and-file of the Continental Army was 
more diverse then previously measured by historians, because the majority of officers were day 
laborers of middling, or poverty-stricken origins.24 In addition to unraveling the significance of 
enrollment requirements for rising officers from working class backgrounds, Royster counters 
Lender’s argument on the social status of the Continental Army officers by emphasizing that “the 
revolutionaries did not have enough gentlemen to go around.”25 Similarly, John Shy asserts that 
commentators of the war “noted that American officers often were not gentlemen.”26 Shy claims 
in A People Numerous and Armed that approximately 15,000 and 20,000 Americans became 
officers in the Continental Army, as well as the colonial militia units. However, the dangers of 
fighting in the Continental force detracted many elite landholding Americans from enlisting. Shy 
argues that “military service in the Revolution deflected life not only outward but inward.”27 
Ultimately, Royster and Shy illustrate that a profound segment of the officer corps were from 
middling, or poverty-stricken backgrounds.  
            A number of scholars conclude that the majority of Continental soldiers hailed from elite 
Anglo-American families that owned a vast amount of acreage, and were financially prosperous. 
However, Royster and Shy counter this argument by indicating the importance of enrollment 
 
24 Royster, 86.  
 
25 Ibid., 87. 
 
26 John Shy, A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American 
Independence (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press), 1990, 251.  
 
27 Ibid. 
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requirements, and the ordinary colonists’ ability to receive commissions for fulfilling enrollment 
quotas.28 In addition to Royster and Shy, in 2014, Derrick Lapp re-examined the Maryland Line’s 
social composition to analyze whether or not the majority of soldiers within this segment of the 
Continental Army were elite landowners. By incorporating consensus and tax data from the late-
eighteenth century, Lapp asserts that a larger segment of the Maryland Line’s officer corps 
originated from a middling socioeconomic backgrounds.29 Ultimately, Lapp successfully argues 
that the social composition of Maryland’s citizenry, as well as the state’s land and monetary 
inflation, contributed to more than twenty-five percent of the Maryland officers originating from 
working class, or financially impoverished backgrounds.30 Lapp incorporates a great deal of his 
statistical findings from Gregory Stiverson’s examination on inequalities in tax levies, and 
property holding, among the Maryland citizenry following the War of Independence. Stiverson 
gathers wealth data from 1783 tax assessments from various Maryland counties, and showed the 
stark social and economic divisions through statistical figures.31 While Lapp included Stiverson’s 
economic analysis in his dissertation, he predominately hones in on two officers within the 
Maryland Line to illustrate the social, and financial, divisions within the colony’s regiment. 
Ultimately, Lapp’s dissertation argues against the narrative that the Continental Army’s officer 
corps were predominately from elite landowning families.32 
 
28 Shy, 251. 
 
29 Derick E. Lapp, Did They Really “Take None But Gentlemen”? Henry Hardman, the Maryland Line, and 
a Reconsideration of the Socioeconomic Composition of the Continental Officer Corps, Journal of Military History, 
2014, 1241, http://web.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=4&sid=d2ec0574-69fe-4267-ac48 
-5797fbe5ab79%40sessionmgr4006 (accessed August 20, 2017).  
 
30 Ibid., 1251. 
 
31 Gregory A. Stiverson, Poverty in the Land of Plenty: Tenancy in Eighteenth-Century Maryland 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press), 1977, 144 – 147. 
 
32 Lapp, 1251. 
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            Lapp and Stiverson’s focus on officer and soldier compensation allows them to measure 
the wealth variance among the Maryland Line, as well as soldiers’ social and economic 
composition following the War of Independence. Similarly, Laura Jensen analyzes the 
development of America’s entitlement policies from the onset of the Revolutionary War through 
the Civil War. While examining land and monetary entitlement benefits for veterans, Jensen argues 
that America’s leaders did not struggle to develop social programs following the Revolutionary 
War.33 Jensen reveals that the Federal Government first developed entitlement programs in 1776. 
While she asserts that veteran pensions and land entitlements were integral social policies for many 
soldiers and their families, Jensen exposes the shortcomings and inequities of these service 
remunerations.34 While the Commutation Act failed, ordinary citizens believed Congressional 
delegates had been coerced by unpredictable officers. 35 Jensen argues that the Commutation notes 
had a twofold impact. First, the shortage of currency in the American economy led to these bonds 
holding an uncertain market value. Similar to other risky government securities during the late-
eighteenth century, a number of officers eventually sold their Commutation notes at a discounted 
value to speculators who hoped to strengthen their investment portfolios.36 Second, Congress’s 
decision to solely bestow Commutation notes to officers sparked discord between low-to-middle 
income laborers, and elite landholders. Poor farmers and mechanics, who did not qualify as 
 
33 Jensen, 10. Jensen argues that inequalities in service remunerations remained for thirty-four years after 
the legislative attempt at Commutation Notes. It was not until the ratification of the Federal Pension Act of 1818 that 
the regular standing army could apply for an entitlement from the Federal Government. However, Jensen reveals 
that the Office of War Department improperly assessed a number of pension applicants’ financial stability. She 
suggests that veterans who did not state that they were disabled struggled to receive an entitlement in comparison to 
applicants with physical impairments. Furthermore, Jensen argues that all Revolutionary War veterans were not 
guaranteed an equal chance at receiving a pension until the revision of the entitlement statute in 1832. 
 
34 Ibid. 
 
35 Ibid., 60.  
 
36 Ibid., 64. 
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beneficiaries of Commutation notes, believed that these payments were unjust in that 
Congressional delegates, and state legislators, failed to adequately compensate poverty-stricken 
veterans.37 Although the majority of Revolutionary veterans neared the end of their lives, Congress 
finally allowed surviving Continentals to apply to receive pension annuities in 1818. However, 
Jensen carefully critiques the social policy’s flaws, specifically the assessment procedure that 
prevented a number elderly, and destitute, veterans from receiving a just remuneration.38 
            While Jensen argues that Congress’s ratification of the 1818 pension legislation led to the 
creation of future welfare programs, she suggests that a number of poverty-stricken soldiers 
struggled to receive fair payments due to the assessors’ inability to properly assess the financial 
stability of its veteran pension applicants.39 Similar to Jensen’s examination of social policy 
legislation, Woody Holton examines the role of market forces following the Revolutionary War, 
as well as ordinary Americans contentions with Congress, and their respective state legislators. 
Holton’s analysis reveals that working class Americans believed that the American economy’s 
recession in the 1780s was rooted from the state government’s disruptive economic policies, such 
as regressive taxes, poorly constructed debt-relief initiatives, and the shortage of specie in 
circulation.40 For example, Holton identifies that as the money supply tightened in the 1780s, land 
lost approximately two-thirds of its value, and livestock prices fell by fifty percent. A number of 
low-to-middle income Americans were irate with the federal and state governments’ decision to 
 
37 Jensen, 62. 
 
38 Ibid., 82. 
 
39 Ibid., 118. 
 
40 Woody Holton, Unruly Americans and the Origins of the Constitution (New York: Hill and Wang), 
2007, 30. 
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support an economic ceiling on specie to allow Congress and state governments’ to pay back 
private creditors’ debts for loaning goods and specie to the Continental Army.41 In addition to 
examining the market forces that caused the economic recession of the late-eighteenth century, 
Holton traces the speculative investment practices for Revolutionary War veterans’ service bonds, 
or Consolidated notes. According to Holton, the speculation behind these bonds contributed to the 
economic slump following the war. During the Revolutionary War, colonists lent specie to the 
government, army contractors, and soldiers. Eventually, these funds were converted into bonds. 
Holton asserts that practically every soldier in the Continental Army received these war bonds for 
their service following the war.42 However, these securities were worth only a fraction of their 
face-value. While some veterans held onto these debt certificates, a number of poor farmers and 
urban mechanics sold these undervalued bonds out of disappointment. The soldiers’ inequitable 
compensation led to a large segment of low-to-middle income Americans protesting against 
Congress and the state governments’ inability to resolve the economic slump following the 
Revolutionary War.43  
            For decades, historians have debated the extent of the social and economic divisions within 
the Continental Army. While Lender, Martin, and Raphael contend that the Continental Army was 
predominately composed of elite landholding men from prominent Anglo-American backgrounds, 
a number of historians have countered this scholarly argument.44 Lapp’s dissertation utilizes 
wealth and tax data to argue that a much larger segment of the Continental Army was composed 
 
41 Holton, 31. 
 
42 Holton, 33. 
 
43 Ibid. 
 
44 Lapp, 1241. 
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of working class Americans who became vulnerable to financially and physically toilsome effects 
of the war, as well as the economic slump during the late-eighteenth century.45 In addition, Jensen’s 
analysis of the development of America’s entitlement policies indicates why the selective, and 
error-prone nature of the Pension Act of 1818 crippled already-impoverished veterans. Evidently, 
these pension applications showcased that the wealth gap within the Continental Army was much 
more profound than previously thought by scholars.46 In addition, Holton’s examination of the role 
of ordinary Americans dealing with the state governments’ disruptive economic policies indicates 
that the economic recession augmented veterans’ economic instability, specifically poor farmers 
and urban mechanics. Ultimately, Holton concludes that asset taxes, inefficient debt-relief 
initiatives, and the shortage of specie in circulation, amplified working class veterans’ inability to 
stabilize their financial livelihoods.47 The socioeconomic divisions with the Continental Army 
cannot be minimized. Furthermore, the recessionary market forces and payment discrepancies 
recorded in officers’ orderly books indicate that the socioeconomic composition of the Connecticut 
Line was striking. 
            Middling, as well as poverty-stricken farmers and mechanics were at the heart of the 
American Revolution, and were the daring laborers that eventually comprised the majority of the 
Continental Army. Although no scholar has undertaken a comprehensive analysis on the social 
and wealth distribution of the Connecticut Line, I did so by constructing a set of case studies on 
Connecticut soldiers, unveiling the impact of rationing techniques on low-to-middle income 
soldiers, incorporating why market forces effected the financial security of Connecticut 
 
45 Lapp, 1251.  
 
46 Jensen, 82. 
  
47 Holton, 30.  
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Continentals, as well as analyzing discrepancies in soldiers’ compensation records. My aim in this 
thesis is to explain that the social and economic distribution of the Connecticut Line was diverse, 
and argue that the Continental Army’s wealth disparity between the rich and the poor was far more 
profound than previously suggested by scholars.   
            Farmers, bricklayers, sawyers, among other physically arduous laborers, cannot be 
forgotten in the shadow of the Early American meritocracy. Despite the absence of tax assessment 
data, Connecticut soldiers’ affidavits on their financial stance and service, as well as soldiers’ asset 
valuations, appraised by county court administrators following the ratification of the Pension Act 
of 1818, reveal the social and economic contrast within the Connecticut Line. After gathering 
Connecticut soldiers’ pension records form the National Archive’s digitized microfilm pension 
proceedings, I aggregate quantitative, and qualitative data, for thirty-six soldiers in Microsoft 
Excel. By comparing service tenure, annual service gratuity, rank, occupation, and total asset value 
among Connecticut beneficiaries, I reveal the extent of the Connecticut Line’s social diversity, and 
its impoverishment gap.      
            In an effort to show the extent of the poverty gap in the Connecticut Line, I have placed an 
emphasis on discrepancies in Connecticut soldiers’ compensation records. Chapter 1 analyzes the 
effects of provisional rationing, and inequities in medical services among Connecticut 
Continentals. Connecticut officers’ orderly books, and paymasters’ rationing account books, 
reveal that a number of soldiers within the Connecticut Line did not receive equivalent clothing 
and equipment rations. In addition, a surgeon’s journal entries indicates that medical attention was 
skewed against impoverished soldiers throughout the war. However, while instances of despair 
and disobedience arose from commanding officers’ rationing techniques, a number of poor farmers 
and urban mechanics continued to fight for the Continental Army in an effort to eventually receive 
20 
 
 
adequate compensations for their service. Ultimately, commanders’ inequivalent provisions left 
many poverty-stricken, and middling soldiers faced with financial hardships as the war came to a 
close. 
            The economic downturn of the 1780s prevented many poor farmers and urban mechanics 
from overcoming the debilitating impact of provisional rationing. Chapter 2 shows how 
inflationary market forces affected the entire citizenry, especially poor farmers and urban 
mechanics who served in the Connecticut Line. In an effort to repay private creditors, state 
legislators devised a number of debt relief legislations that crippled low-to-middle income 
Americans. As the supply of specie contracted, a number of Connecticut veterans were stuck in a 
poverty trap. Chapter 2 also considers the public’s reaction to the inflationary economy, and the 
failure of state legislatures to indemnify impoverished soldiers through risky securities. Ordinary 
citizens believed that the state assemblies’ monetary policies devastated the American economy, 
and criticized elite misrule following the Revolutionary War. By allowing government bond 
speculation, and adhering to private creditors’ demands, state legislators and Congressional 
delegates were criticized for not properly allocating funds toward indigent soldiers. 
            Eventually, as Chapter 3 shows, Connecticut’s debt-relief legislation deteriorated labor 
productivity among low-to-middle income Connecticut inhabitants, especially veterans of the 
Revolutionary War. Despite Congress’s ratification of the Pension Act of 1818, an entitlement 
program headed by the Office of War Department, a number of surviving Connecticut veterans 
did not receive equitable benefits. Rather, an aggregation of a socially and economically diverse 
population of Connecticut soldiers revealed that pension assessors examined applicants on their 
social standing, and, in a number of cases, granted insubstantial payments to the most 
impoverished veterans. By identifying the parallels and contrasts between middling, and poverty-
21 
 
 
stricken soldiers’ payment discrepancies, I illuminate the extent of social diversity, the 
impoverishment gap, and the discrepancies in material provisions and remunerations among 
Connecticut Continentals. This social economic historical piece is a testament to the grievances, 
and financial hardships, of ordinary citizens during a period of unprecedented rebellion and 
uncertainty. 
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CHAPTER 1: A FRAMEWORK FOR THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC COMPOSITION 
OF THE CONNECTICUT LINE 
 
 
            Josias Poheague, a Native American soldier for the first and fifth regiments of the 
Connecticut Line, was one of twenty-two documented Connecticut soldiers who died during the 
Battle of Yorktown in 1781.48 On May 8, 1783, the Connecticut Committee of Payable issued a 
postmortem military pay voucher for Poheague’s “services incurred for the United States.”49 The 
voucher indicated that Poheague resided in Stonington, Connecticut, and served from 1777 until 
1781. While there is no way to confirm Poheague’s total assets, nor his occupation in the 
committee’s order, his residency on Long Island Sound indicated that he was most likely a 
maritime laborer who took up arms against Great Britain.50 Poheague’s voucher, which totaled 
forty pounds and eighteen pence, presented a rudimentary sketch of his economic livelihood. 
            Poheague appears to have left little behind. Over the course of his life, he faded in and out 
of his commanding officers’ muster rolls, pay rolls, daily commands in officers’ orderly books, as 
well as the town of Stonington’s genealogical registers. However, the Committee of Payable’s 
1783 voucher, as well as the Connecticut Adjutant-General’s Office’s 1889 service record, allows 
for a sharper picture of Poheague’s social and economic situation prior to his death. Poheague 
initially joined the Connecticut Line as a non-commissioned private on February 22, 1777, and 
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served in Captain James Eldridge’s Stonington Company until late-December 1780. The 
Connecticut Adjunct-General’s service record indicated that he then served as a non-
commissioned private within Captain Asahel Hodge’s Company from January 1, 1781 to his death 
on October 16, 1781.51 Although Poheague was a Native American who fought throughout the 
Revolutionary War, he was not an anomaly within the rank-and-file of the Continental Army. The 
enlistment of indigenous peoples was an integral component of the success of the Continental 
Army.52 While Poheague’s service record depicted his faithfulness to the Continental Army, as 
well as its ethnic diversity, the Connecticut Committee of Payable’s postmortem voucher failed to 
properly recompense Poheague’s beneficiaries. 
            Poheague’s payment certificate was unusual in its composition compared to compensation 
records used by scholars, such as officers’ orderly book tables, and service entitlements from the 
federal government. Joseph Plumb Martin, a Connecticut farmer who served for seven years as a 
private within the Connecticut Line, revealed in his memoir that while payments were rarely 
distributed to soldiers during the war, a Continental voucher usually translated into specie, and 
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entitled a soldier to a discount for a specified good, such as clothing, staple foods, and land. 53 
However, Poheague’s voucher did not indicate either one of these guarantees. Instead, this order 
specified that the committee appointed Captain Phineas Stanton, an officer for the Connecticut 
Line, to administer the “intestate estate of Josias Poheague,” as well as handle his “bonds taken as 
the law directs.”54 According to the order, Poheague’s death allowed for an officer in the 
Connecticut Line to administer the sale of his Stonington property, and redeem his payment. 
Poheague’s voucher epitomized the inequities that many Connecticut soldiers dealt with during, 
and following, the Revolutionary War. 
            Poheague’s postmortem pay voucher represented a first-hand account of the subtle, yet 
pervasive payment discrepancies toward a number of Continentals. The Committee of Payable 
assigned Phineas Stanton, an elite landholding resident of Stonington, as the bearer of Poheague’s 
payment, and the administrator of Poheague’s acreage in New London County.55 According to 
Richard Anson Wheeler’s genealogical register, Stanton served as a British captain during the 
Seven Years’ War in Nova Scotia. He also served as a Stonington deputy from 1760 to 1771. 
Although Stanton was sixty-four at the time of the Committee of Payable’s voucher, he was still 
an influential businessman in Stonington.  Yet, why was Stanton assigned as the bearer of 
Poheague’s rightful voucher? For one thing, the voucher did not indicate that Poheague had a 
family. However, a 1785 preamble passed by the Connecticut General Assembly revealed that 
Stonington land agents sought Poheague’s acreage for a reconstruction of New London County’s 
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“bridges and roads” in order to develop a more efficient public mail route.56 According to 
genealogical records, Paul Wheeler, Edward Hancox, and Stanton were instructed by two 
“representatives of Stonington” to “measure the highway from Long Point to New London” in 
order to “raise three hundred pounds lawful money, to enable them to build a bridge across the 
cove, called Lambert’s Cove, from Pine Point to Quanaduct.”57 And while there is no record of 
exactly where Poheague’s designated acreage was located in Stonington, the Committee of 
Payable’s decision to name Stanton as the bearer of Poheague’s voucher showcased Anglo-
American infringement on rightful indigenous land, as well as a disturbing compensation 
inequity.58 
            Prior to the existence of payment discrepancies among Connecticut soldiers, men like 
Poheague were eager to join the Continental force due to the provisions promised to them. In 
addition to settlement certificates that could later be sold to obtain clothing and money, all soldiers 
were ensured adequate daily rations of goods. According to Joseph Plumb Martin, soldiers were 
promised, upon enlistment, “one pound of good and wholesome fresh or salt beef, or three fourths 
of a pound of good salt pork, a pound of good flour,” among other staple goods. In addition, Martin 
noted that privates were promised “six dollars and two thirds a month,” upon enlistment. For poor 
farmers and urban mechanics, these provisions proved to be an unmatched selling point.59 In 
addition to these procurements, camaraderie drove men to join. After registering as a soldier, 
 
56 Richard Anson Wheeler, History of the Town of Stonington, County of New London, Connecticut, from 
its First Settlement in 1649 to 1900, with a Genealogical Register of Stonington Families, Hathi Trust Digital 
Library, 1966, 109, https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=yale.39002003062560;view=1up;seq=127 (accessed 
September 3, 2017). 
 
57 Ibid. 
 
58 “Connecticut Committee of Payable Remittance to Josias Poheague, May 8, 1783,” Military Pay 
Vouchers, 1783, 99190 (Sheet 1), Connecticut Historical Society, Hartford, Connecticut.  
 
59 Martin, 245-247. 
26 
 
 
Martin described an unprecedented sense of “liveliness” among enlistees. The following entry 
from Martin’s memoir illustrated that monetary assurances, as well as fraternity, influenced his 
decision to fight for independence. “I thought, as I must go, I might as well endeavor to get as 
much for my skin as I could; - accordingly, I told them that I would go for them.”60 Whether or 
not men like Martin and Poheague believed that the war would threaten their economic security, 
enlisted men believed that their service would play a profound role in the future relationship 
between the American Colonies and Britain. However, Martin’s memoir indicated that many 
soldiers never received the provisional rations promised to them by Continental commanders and 
Congressional delegates. Despite their valor, a number of Connecticut Continentals suffered from 
the skewed distribution of remunerations. 
            Continentals’ compensation records reveals the extent of the social and economic divisions 
within the Connecticut Line. Poheague’s postmortem voucher was a shocking account of the 
partiality of soldiers’ distorted payments. In addition, this unique voucher indicated that the social 
and economic composition of the Connecticut Line was more diverse than previously understood. 
While scholars have pointed out that the majority of the enlisted soldiers were from middling 
backgrounds, Poheague’s advantageous property countered this argument.61 According to the 
Committee of Payable’s 1783 payment, Poheague held a substantial amount of acreage that led to 
the Committee of Payable’s decision to assign a prominent landowning agent from Stonington to 
be the administrator for future transactions with Poheague’s property. Although Poheague served 
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as a non-commissioned private, the Committee of Payable’s indication that he owned valuable 
property in one of the most economically vibrant maritime towns in Connecticut during the late-
eighteenth century suggests that the social and economic composition of the enlisted soldiers was 
communally and financially diverse. 
            The Committee of Payable’s improper issuance of Poheague’s redeemable voucher is a 
unique example of the existence of drastic compensation discrepancies among Connecticut 
soldiers, and the fact that a soldiers’ social and economic status was an integral component of 
service payment discrepancies.62 After examining Connecticut soldiers’ asset schedules, 
compensation records, and officers’ orderly books, the Connecticut Line’s diverse social and 
economic composition indicated that low-to-middle income soldiers’ remunerations were skewed 
in comparison to soldiers from elite landowning families.63 As the American economy constricted 
following the War for Independence, a number of poor farmers and mechanics, who served as 
privates and officers, struggled to escape economic instability, malnutrition, and physical defects 
caused by the war. 
            From the onset of the war, inequitable compensations were evident throughout the 
Connecticut Line’s officer corps. After the Continental Congress authorized state legislatures to 
raise a quota of infantry regiments for the establishment of the Continental Army, General 
Washington was concerned about the election of men for the Continental officer corps. In a letter 
to John Hancock in September 1776, Washington urged Hancock that in order to organize the 
Continental Army “upon a permanent footing,” the Continental Congress must enlist men 
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“actuated by Principles of honour, and a spirit of enterprize.”64 In other words, Washington implied 
that the Continental officer corps should be comprised of wealthy landholding men. Yet how do 
we explain the ascension of a working class farmer from New Hartford, Connecticut from a 
Lieutenant to a Captain in less than a year, and the fact that he received a Continental Captain’s 
commission?65 
            According to Aaron Austin’s 1820 affidavit presented to the Litchfield County Court for a 
Federal service entitlement, Austin was appointed a Lieutenant in Colonel Hubael Griswold’s 
regiment in “April or May 1775,” and served in the “Northern department” until December 1775. 
Following his service in Griswold’s regiment, Austin indicated that he received a “Captains 
commission signed by John Hancock,” and became a Captain within Colonel Charles Burrall’s 
regiment on January 19, 1776. In addition, Austin noted that he “raised a company joined the 
regiment marched into Canada and continued in the service until the fifth day of February 1777.”66 
Austin’s ability to enroll troops indicated that soldiers from laboring backgrounds took advantage 
of enrollment requirements to advance their rank-and-file in the Continental Army. Yet, while 
Austin quickly ascended to a commissioned Captain within the Connecticut Line, his economic 
livelihood following the war indicated a stark account of payment discrepancies within the state’s 
quota of Continentals.67 On December 24, 1817, the House of Representatives passed a bill that 
provided federal pensions of $8 per month for soldiers and $20 per month to officers who served 
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in the Revolutionary War, and were incapable of earning an income.68 Although this federal 
assistance was selective due to the sheer number of applicants, the seventy-two year old secured a 
pension from the United States Government on April 1, 1818. At a rate of $20 per month, Austin 
received a total of $102.66 from the Federal Pension Act of 1818.69 Yet, on July 5, 1820 Austin 
presented an affidavit to the Litchfield County Court for a more suitable remuneration for his 
service. Evidently, the Federal Government’s payment for Austin’s service in the Revolutionary 
War was not adequate, and it did not ameliorate his economic instability following the war.70 
            As a seventy-four year old farmer “able to do as much business as men in general of my 
age,” Austin was indigent. Although he was a commissioned Captain, Austin’s livelihood was 
affected by the recession of the late-eighteenth century.71 In addition to his disagreement over the 
federal government’s pension, Austin indicated that the total value of his possessions added up to 
$543, and included “forty acres of land,” “two cows,” “one old horse,” “two axes,” among other 
meagre belongings. Austin’s static assets, and his inability to earn an income prevented him from 
supporting his “feeble” wife, his “very poor” thirty-six year old daughter, and himself. 
Furthermore, Austin noted that he required a “greater sum” for his service in the Connecticut Line, 
and he required “the munificence of Government” to support him in his “old age and further saith 
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rot.”72 Ultimately, he was trapped in a financially unstable position following his years as a Captain 
for the Connecticut Line. 
            While some scholars suggest that the Continental officer corps were solely comprised of 
elite landholding men, Austin’s social and economic standing countered this claim. Many 
Connecticut soldiers were poor, or middling men, who momentarily quit their agrarian and 
mechanical trades to serve in the War of Independence.73 A case study of Poheague’s and Austin’s 
service and compensation records indicates that the Connecticut Line was socially and 
economically heterogeneous. Evidently, poor farmers’ and urban mechanics’ economic 
instabilities stemmed from payment inequities, and market forces in the late-eighteenth century. 
According to Holton, while Connecticut legislators believed that debt relief legislation would 
properly pay back private creditors for loaning money for the Continental Army’s supplies, these 
ordinances triggered a shortage of specie in circulation. As a result, sawyers, farmers, and other 
laborers became indebted to landowners, creditors, and tax collectors. The recession that followed 
the war prevented a number of low-to-middle income veterans from being able to earn a steady 
income to support themselves, and their families.74 Furthermore, while the Federal Pension Act of 
1818 was a vanguard social policy program for the Federal Government of the United States, 
administrators for the Office of the War Department poorly assessed its pension applicants on their 
social and financial standings. After aggregating a population of captains, lieutenants, sergeants, 
and privates in the Connecticut Line, the social and economic diversity of Connecticut’s enlisted 
soldiers and officer corps was striking. Officers’ orderly books, soldiers’ pay roll records, letter 
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correspondences between officers and Connecticut legislators, as well as soldiers’ pension records, 
revealed that a soldier’s social and economic composition played an integral role in his 
remunerations for service. 
            In order to properly set the stage for how a Revolutionary War soldier’s social and 
economic standing figured into their remunerations, we must look back to the start of the war. 
Following the Battles of Lexington and Concord, the Patriot force was composed entirely of militia 
and state troops. According to historian D.J. Mulloy, Washington and the delegates of the 
Continental Congress believed that a colony-funded army would be a more successful force against 
British troops than decentralized militia units.75 However, throughout the Revolutionary War, the 
Connecticut Militia remained an integral component of the American colonists’ force. Charles Hall 
suggests that the Connecticut Militia averaged twenty-three thousand men throughout the war, and 
was carved up into “twenty-eight regiments of infantry and five regiments of light horse.”76 In 
addition to these volunteer regiments, in September and October 1776, Congress authorized the 
enlistment of eighty-eight regiments to serve as the Continental Army, eight regiments being raised 
in Connecticut. According to Charles Hall, 7,400 “from the [Connecticut] militia” became a part 
of the “troops of the United Provinces of North America.”77 Over the course of two months, the 
Continental Army formed into a centralized unit that would counteract British assaults on rural 
communities and sustainable commercial hubs throughout the American colonies. In 1777, 
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Alexander Purdie, a publisher from Williamsburg, Virginia, printed an ordinance authorized by 
the Continental Congress that stated that the Continental soldiers and officers “shall be raised, 
officered, clothed, armed, and equipped,” by each states’ legislatures “necessary for the defense 
and welfare of the United States.”78 However, inequivalent medical attention, clothing rations, and 
equipment quotas contradicted the delegates’ agenda for a “perpetual union between the states.”79 
            Connecticut officers’ orderly books, paymasters’ rationing account books, and surgeons’ 
journal entries reveal that a number of soldiers within the Connecticut Line did not receive 
equivalent equipment rations, nor medical attention throughout the war. Noadiah Hooker, a 
resident of Farmington, Connecticut, served as a Captain in General Joseph Spencer’s second 
regiment from May 1, 1775 to December 18, 1775. As the descendant of Thomas Hooker, a 
Congressionalist minister who founded Connecticut in the early-seventeenth century, Hooker 
hailed from an elite Anglo-American family. While Hooker served as a Captain prior to the 
organization of the Connecticut Line, his seven and a half month tenure as a military leader for 
Connecticut enabled him to become a leader for the Connecticut Militia following his discharge. 
In 1779, he was promoted to a Colonel in the Connecticut Militia’s fifteenth regiment.80 Hooker’s 
orderly book consisted of a collection of military orders and disciplinary issues regarding the 
Connecticut Militia’s fifteenth regiment, as well as a number of Connecticut Line regiments. 
According to his entries throughout 1776, Hooker’s militia regiment was stationed at a 
Ticonderoga encampment with a number of regiments from the Connecticut Line. Ultimately, his 
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entries from October 1776 revealed low soldier morale and unsettling verdicts for court-martials 
among the Continental soldiers.81 In order to maintain control of the regular standing army, 
procedures, such as granting court-martials to disobedient soldiers, were common. However, 
stringent martial protocols created numerous instances of soldiers deserting their posts.82 
            While a number of Hooker’s entries illustrated why some soldiers decided to disobey their 
commanders’ orders and desert their companies, there were a number of instances of fraternity 
among soldiers. For example, while stationed at an unspecified Ticonderoga headquarters, Hooker 
recorded a cordial order authorized by Captain Asa Bray for his entire militia company on October 
4, 1776. Due to the “wet weather,” Hooker noted that the company’s commanders issued “one gill 
of rum to each noncommissioned officer and soldier in the company.”83 According to Hooker’s 
entry in his orderly book, Bray felt the need to reward his militia unit for their determination to 
stay in the fight, despite the apparent torrential rainfall. However, examples like Bray’s generosity 
to fulfill his soldiers’ thirst for alcohol were rare. The hardships were evident from soldiers’ 
disciplinary punishments recorded by Hooker, especially for deserters.84 
            Hooker’s orderly book indicated that defiance and desertion was common among soldiers 
who disagreed with officers’ imposing orders. Recalcitrance was rampant throughout the 
Connecticut Line, as well as the Connecticut Militia.85 On October 6, 1776, Hooker recorded in 
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his orderly book that a “general court martial of the lines” was to be held the following day for 
“three lieutenants belonging to the independent company [of Captain Jonathan Johnson],” for 
“deserting their posts without orders or being attacked by their enemies.”86 In addition to the three 
unnamed lieutenants, Hooker’s entry also noted that the court-martial included an unspecified 
number of “non-commissioned officers,” as well as an undefined number of “soldiers from three 
[other] companies.”87 Although Hooker did not explicitly state which regiment the court-martial 
pertained to, a cross-reference between the Connecticut Adjutant General’s office’s service record 
and Hooker’s orderly record indicated that Hooker referred to a disciplinary issue in Colonel Philip 
Burr Bradley’s Connecticut Line Battalion.88 Ultimately, Hooker’s record of a court-martial for 
unidentified soldiers within Colonel Bradley’s Connecticut Line battalion signaled that a number 
of soldiers evaded their commanding officers’ orders due to a potential dissatisfaction over the 
rations set by their superiors, or discontent over their commanders’ directives. 
            The Connecticut Adjunct-General’s service record indicated that throughout the battalion’s 
existence, seventeen men were appointed to lieutenant, and all served at one point or another. 
While Hooker kept the court-martialed soldiers’ names anonymous, he most likely kept these 
soldiers undisclosed in order to not interfere with the “Deputy Quartermaster General’s” decision 
“to dismiss all who are negligent of their duty.”89 According to Hooker’s entry, the commanding 
officers’ decision to drop disciplinary charges triggered the battalion’s superiors to place more of 
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an emphasis on soldiers’ order completion and time away from their encampments. Hooker 
described this decision by noting that the “commissary is to deliver to every noncommissioned 
officer a soldier who are returned from guard every morning at nine o’clock,” and that the “officer 
coming off guard [is] to sign the return of the commissary.”90 Ultimately, defiance triggered the 
battalion’s leaders to adopt a more strict policy against soldiers disobeying orders. In effect, the 
commanding officers’ draconian policy amplified the tension between the leaders of the 
Connecticut Line’s fifth battalion and its soldiers.91 
            Hooker’s account of disobedience within the Connecticut Line’s battalion indicated that a 
number of soldiers were dissatisfied with their commanding officers’ oppressive orders.92 In 
addition, inequivalent material rations were prevalent among the Connecticut Line, and created a 
sense of discontent among many soldiers. The paymaster papers of Colonel Elisha Sheldon’s light 
dragoons regiment illustrated an example of the rationing techniques used by the Connecticut Line. 
According to the Connecticut Adjunct-General’s service record, Sheldon was appointed colonel 
of the second regiment of light dragoons on December 12, 1776, and served throughout the war. 
The Connecticut Adjunct-General’s service record noted that for most of the war, Sheldon’s light 
dragoons served along the eastern side of the Hudson River in eastern New York and western 
Connecticut.93 This geographically diverse regiment included men from towns in Hartford County, 
as well as northern New Jersey, western Massachusetts, as well as a lieutenant from France. In 
fact, Elijah Janes, the appointed paymaster for the regiment in 1782, was a resident of Brimfield, 
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Massachusetts. Janes served as a cornet for the regiment in mid-November 1779, and a lieutenant 
beginning in late-November 1779. After sustaining a ligament injury on the battlefield, Janes 
became the regiment’s paymaster in 1782.94 Although this regiment was geographically diverse, 
Janes’ paymaster papers showcased inequivalent material rationing among the regiment’s 
privates.95 
            Janes’ clothing record for the light dragoon regiment indicated that all soldiers did not 
receive the necessary equipment for battle. According to Janes’ “account of clothing [for the] 
second regiment [of] light dragoons” from an unspecified year, the thirty-two recorded men 
received the designated regiment’s coats, as well as one cloak each. However, all seven officers, 
and six out of the twenty-three privates received a pair of boots. This begs the question as to why 
less than thirty percent of the privates in this regiment received footwear.96 Evidently, this metric 
contradicted the Continental Congress’s 1777 ordinance that all Continental soldiers and officers 
“shall be raised, officered, clothed, armed, and equipped.”97 
            Joseph Plumb Martin’s memoirs reveal that commanding officers’ issuance of inequivalent 
clothing provisions, and soldiers’ dissatisfaction, was common throughout the Connecticut Line, 
and created frustration and misery for a number of soldiers. In one instance Martin recounted that 
he and his comrades “were forced by our old master, Necessity, to lay down and sleep if we could, 
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with three others of our constant companions, Fatigue, Hunger, and Cold.”98 Martin’s account of 
the unjust material rationing techniques used by a number of commanders for the Connecticut Line 
depicted the miserable conditions many soldiers dealt with on a daily basis. In addition, Martin’s 
illustration of the harsh weather conditions that a number of soldiers faced during the winter of 
Valley Forge spoke volumes about the skewed material rations authorized by the Connecticut 
Line’s commanding officers. During the winter of 1777, Martin noted that he and his fellow 
soldiers were compelled to complete their orders despite having “little or no strength to perform it 
with.”99 Martin’s accounts, and Janes’ 1782 clothing record for the second regiment of light 
dragoons, showcased the extent of inequivalent material rations to a number of soldiers within the 
Connecticut Line. 
            Hooker’s orderly book and Janes’ rationing accounts suggest that a number of soldiers’ 
inability to receive equal rations led to instances of despair and disobedience. In addition, the 
Connecticut Line’s underlying social and economic diversity among the Connecticut infantry led 
to inequivalent medical attention in the treatment of physical and mental impairments, as well as 
bacterial syndromes. Dr. Albigence Waldo served as a surgeon for the Continental Army from 
1775 to 1779. According to Joseph Hall’s 1883 compilation of the Waldo family’s town and 
private records, Waldo, and his fellow licensed physicians, ventured from his hometown of 
Pomfret, Connecticut to Boston “immediately after receiving news of the battle of Lexington, their 
leader probably being General [Israel] Putnam.”100 From April 1775 to December 1776, Waldo 
served as a physician in Cambridge and Roxbury “until honorably discharged, his health having 
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failed him.”101 Following his recovery of an unspecified health circumstance, Waldo was 
commissioned by Governor Trumbull “surgeon of the ship Cromwell” in December 1776.102 
According to the Vice Admiralty Court of Halifax, Nova Scotia, the Oliver Cromwell was one of 
the largest full-rigged ships constructed for the Connecticut naval force during the war, and 
eventually was captured by the British Navy in July 1779.103 In April 1777, Waldo, “by the 
Governor’s permission,” served as a surgeon for the first Connecticut Infantry Regiment until his 
discharge in October 1779.104 Throughout his tenure as a physician for the Continental Army, 
Waldo recorded notes on the services he performed during the war, as well as the inequivalent 
medical services provided to low-ranking soldiers during and after the war. 
            According to a letter to the Connecticut State legislature circa 1785, Waldo pitied the 
Connecticut soldiers’ “undeserved indigence,” and a number of soldiers’ “doleful prospect of rags 
and starvation” during the late-1770s.105 Waldo’s letter indicated that the Connecticut Line’s social 
and economic divisions hindered low-to-middle income soldiers from being able to receive 
adequate medical attention above their commanders, who, in the majority of cases, were from elite 
colonial families.106 According to the Waldo family’s genealogical records, Waldo’s unpublished 
patient records contained approximately “6,000 patients treated by him,” and that “General 
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Putnam’s name appears several times.”107 Furthermore, the Waldo family’s genealogical record 
noted that Albigence “was a neighbor and intimate friend of the General,” given that “his brother 
Samuel was the General’s son-in-law.”108 Nicknamed, “Old Put,” Israel Putnam hailed from an 
Anglo-American family, and commanded the third regiment of the Connecticut Line during the 
Battle of Bunker Hill, the Siege of Boston, as well as the Continental Army’s campaign in New 
York during the late-1770s.109 Ultimately, the inability of commanding officers to provide 
equivalent medical attention throughout the Connecticut Line led to a number of soldiers dying 
from curable afflictions, and deserting their regiments. 
            According to one of Waldo’s diary entries from January 4, 1778, an indigenous soldier 
within the Connecticut Line perished because of delayed medical attention. While stationed at 
Valley Forge with the Connecticut Line’s first regiment, Waldo noted that he was “called to relieve 
a Soldier thought to be dying – he expired before I reached the Hutt.”110 Waldo recounted in his 
diary that the deceased “was an Indian – an excellent soldier – and an obedient good-natured 
fellow,” and that “he fought for those very people who disinherited his forefathers.”111 After 
reflecting on the inequivalent medical attention throughout the Connecticut Line, Waldo noted 
“what a frail-dying creature is Man.”112 Ultimately, Waldo’s depiction of a soldier who was unable 
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to receive proper medical treatment suggests that commanding officers received more acute 
medical attention than soldiers within the regular standing army.  
            Albigence Waldo’s letter to Connecticut legislators, his patient records, as well as his 
depiction of the hopelessness a number of soldiers’ dealt with while on the battlefield, indicated 
that many soldiers experienced emotional turmoil from their inability to receive adequate medical 
attention. Why did a number of commanding officers for the Connecticut Line not place more of 
an emphasis on universal medical treatment for soldiers who suffered from inequivalent clothing 
rations or curable inflictions? After analyzing Waldo’s notes on his service during the 
Revolutionary War, it is evident that a Connecticut soldier’s social and economic composition 
played a significant role in whether or not he was able to receive medical attention, rudiment 
rations, as well as financial security. At the onset of the war, poor farmers and urban mechanics 
believed they held the advantage among the Continental Army’s commanders. Men from low-to-
middle income backgrounds were more likely to enlist if they received confirmation that they 
would be compensated with “good and regular pay, annual clothing, and adequate food.”113 
Charles Royster argues that the Continental Army’s constant desire for able-bodied men 
throughout the war created a shortage for soldiers. In effect, middling, and poverty-stricken men 
thought they held the upper hand in bartering for adequate clothing, nourishment, and pay.114 
Joseph Plumb Martin recounted this perceived edge over commanders by noting, “I might as well 
endeavor to get as much for my skin as I could.”115 Contrary to Martin’s eagerness to receive 
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sufficient provisions for his service, a number of Connecticut Continentals received inequivalent 
compensations and rations. 
            Albigence Waldo’s diary entries revealed that a number of Connecticut Line soldiers faced 
financial hardships as a result of their commanders’ issuance of inequivalent provisions and 
remunerations. On December 28, 1777, while stationed at Valley Forge, Waldo  noted that “Six or 
Seven [officers] of our Regiment” resigned from Colonel Jedediah Huntington’s infantry regiment 
due to their “Families being so much neglected at home on account of Provisions.”116 Waldo’s 
illustration of the resignation of these officers revealed that a number of commissioned officers 
believed they were not justly compensated for their service. Furthermore, Waldo indicated that “it 
is a melancholy reflection that what is of the most universal importance, is most universally 
neglected – I mean keeping up the credit of money.”117 According to Waldo’s depiction, a number 
of Connecticut Continentals believed that they were being financially deprived by their 
commanders, as well as their state’s legislators. 
            Inadequate medical attention and material rations, as well as deficient remunerations, 
occurred throughout the Connecticut Line.118 In a number of instances, these deficiencies 
correlated with soldiers’ social and economic standing. In addition to the unjust provisional 
rationing techniques used by commanding officers, many laboring soldiers remained vulnerable 
against the inflationary market forces that laid ahead. Woody Holton suggests that the 
Revolutionary War singlehandedly contributed to the economic recession of the late-eighteenth 
century. Prior to the Treaty of Paris in 1783, state legislators were burdened with copious amounts 
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of debt that had to be repaid to private creditors who supplied funds for the Continental Army. 
Ultimately, the state governments’ debts triggered inflationary policies, such as the shortage of 
specie, myopic debt relief legislation, as well as exorbitant taxes on poor farmers and urban 
mechanics. In effect, a number of soldiers from the low-to-middle income sphere wrongfully 
suffered with these debilitating shortcomings.119 
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CHAPTER 2: MARKET FORCES AND THE RECESSION OF THE 1780s 
            
            On April 13, 1780, Governor Jonathan Trumbull called a meeting with the Connecticut 
legislators to amend the Continental Congress’s “Act for the Establishment of Public Credit.” The 
Connecticut General Assembly accepted the stark reality that “at a time when no regular civil 
governments were established of sufficient energy,” the state governments struggled to properly 
collect taxes and redeem bills of credit. Because of these barriers, the Connecticut General 
Assembly agreed with Congress’s decision to “reduce the quantity of paper medium in circulation” 
in order to “appropriate funds that shall ensure the punctual redemption of the bills.”120 Because 
the amount of paper money declined, and specie remained scarce, the Connecticut legislative’s 
order created debt deflation for ordinary Americans’ private arrears and taxes.121 Ultimately, the 
Connecticut General Assembly, along with other state governments, believed a quota for paper 
money would allow the Connecticut legislators to organize their payments, and, as a result, swiftly 
pay back the private creditors’ bills of credit. For ordinary Americans, however, the shortage of 
specie led to a stark decline in consumer purchasing power. As scholars have pointed out, the 
economic recession of the 1780s was rooted in the state government’s disruptive economic policies 
of debt-relief legislation, exorbitant taxes on low-to-middle income Americans, and the shortage 
of currency. 122  
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            The Connecticut General Assembly’s indebtedness to private creditors, and the legislators’ 
short-sighted debt-relief legislation for creditors of the war, caused deflation following the war. 
Throughout the War for Independence, private creditors provided the Continental Army with 
supplies and funds. According to correspondence between Captain Roger Bulkley and Connecticut 
merchants, loans allowed the Connecticut Line to function. As a leader in charge of supplying the 
Continental Army with supplies in Colchester, Bulkley was heavily involved in livestock dealings 
with David Trumbull, Jeremiah Wadsworth, among other private creditors in Connecticut. For 
instance, on May 21, 1778, Wadsworth wrote to Bulkley confirming that he lent Bulkley “grey 
horses by the barren.”123 Although Wadsworth did not specify the number of horses lent to 
Bulkley, his business receipt indicated that the Connecticut Line’s commanders heavily relied on 
private creditors’ dealings. Wadsworth was appointed by the Connecticut General Assembly, at 
the onset of the war, to buy yarn stockings, kettles, pork, as well as procure over one thousand 
pounds of specie for the Connecticut Line.124  
            Because of his experience as a dependable private creditor in supplying goods and funds 
for the Connecticut Line, Wadsworth served as Commissary General of Purchases from April 1778 
to December 1779. Bulkley’s 1778 correspondence with Wadsworth revealed that private creditors 
could readily access supplies for the war effort through business and political connections. In 
addition to Bulkley’s transaction with Wadsworth, David Trumbull, confirmed that he sold 
Bulkley “sixty head of Continental oxen” on June 2, 1778.125 As the son of the Governor of 
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Connecticut, Trumbull served as Assistant Commissary-General for the Connecticut General 
Assembly during the war. According to his personal and business correspondences, Trumbull 
handled supply transactions for the Connecticut Line.126 Ultimately, Bulkley’s transactions with 
Trumbull and Wadsworth revealed that private creditors were an integral component of the day-
to-day operations of the Connecticut Line.     
            Connecticut’s debt relief legislation during the late-eighteenth century, engineered by 
Trumbull and the state’s legislators, sought to repay private creditors who supplied funds for the 
Continental Army. In the process of doing so, Connecticut legislators’ decision to create a shortage 
of currency orchestrated a deflationary economy as consumer purchasing power contracted, and 
prices fell drastically. In conjunction with this strained monetary policy, the war brought on steep 
taxation. Stephen Reed Grossbart argues that Connecticut’s regressive tax system placed an 
unprecedented burden on a majority of the state’s population, specifically poor farmers and urban 
mechanics. As I show in Figure 1, tax rates increased by approximately eightfold from the rates 
levied prior to 1777 to those imposed during the early-1780s.127 The Connecticut legislators’ debt-
relief legislation wrongfully miscounted for how shrinking the amount of paper money in 
circulation would affect Connecticut’s working class.128 With a lack of sound economic decision-
making, Connecticut’s debt-relief legislation materialized during the late-1770s. Legislators 
focused on strategies to repay private creditors for their financial assistance to Connecticut’s 
legislative body during the war. Holton argues that the majority of private creditors who supplied 
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funds to the Revolutionary War effort dabbled in land speculation schemes or invested in risky 
government securities. While a number of the Continental Army’s debtholders coincidentally 
became delegates at the Constitutional Convention, Holton reveals that state legislators believed 
they had an obligation to alleviate their debts with private creditors in order to revive the war-
ridden American economy.129 The Connecticut General Assembly, like many of the other states’ 
legislative bodies, believed that compensating debtholders’ bills of credit was of grave importance 
following the war. However, the legislators’ decision to create a shortage of circulating currency 
prevented many middling and poverty-stricken Americans from earning a tenable income, and 
burdened them with the war creditors’ debt.130 
Figure 1: Tax Rates on Connecticut Citizenry Adjusted for Fiat Depreciation, 1774-1790 
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            On January 2, 1778, the Connecticut General Assembly authorized the Continental Loan 
Office’s “subscription papers,” that could not be “less than two hundred dollars,” to be bestowed 
among sixty private creditors for their efforts to supply and fund the Connecticut Line. Among the 
debtholders listed were Colonel Hezekiah Wyllys, Captain Aaron Bissell, and Deacon John 
Whiting. According to the legislative order, the Connecticut General Assembly decided to 
“procure Loan Office Certificates in favor of the lenders” in order to show proof of their debt to 
the state. Furthermore, the Connecticut legislators determined that the sixty private creditors would 
be “allowed by this State one quarter per cent” interest on their investments.131 While the 1778 
order did not indicate a grand total for the state’s accounts payable for the private creditors, nor 
did it outline whether or not this interest would grow over time, this resolution indicated that the 
Connecticut General Assembly began mapping out repayment strategies for the state’s debtholders 
during the Revolutionary War. The 1778 order also revealed that the Connecticut Line would not 
have existed without loans from private creditors. For instance, if each of the sixty creditors 
received a bill of credit entitling them to the minimum payment of two hundred dollars, the 
Connecticut General Assembly owed approximately $12,000 for their debts.132  In part, the private 
creditors’ decision to supply the Connecticut Line with supplies and funds was courageous due to 
the fact that the Connecticut legislators did not confirm that they would fully repay the debtholders. 
However, following the war, the Connecticut General Assembly’s debt-relief legislation 
contributed to the economic recession of the 1780s, and the devastating financial shortcomings of 
a number of low-to-middle income veterans.     
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            While private creditors supported the Connecticut General Assembly’s debt-relief 
legislation in order to receive a sufficient return on their investments, poor veteran farmers, and 
urban mechanics, remained vulnerable. According to a 1779 article from the Connecticut Courant, 
many Americans were concerned with the Connecticut legislators’ debt. An anonymous author 
going by the pseudonym, “Observator,” asserted that when the General Assembly “emitted those 
bills, and pledged her faith for the redemption of them, she was in great distress.”133 Furthermore, 
the author interpreted state governments’ debt with private creditors as a “bad bargain” because 
poor farmers and urban mechanics would suffer from higher taxes. According to the anonymous 
author, if state governments raised taxes in order to alleviate the states’ debts, “a middling farmer 
from the eastern States, would not have more to pay than the avails of one yoke of fat oxen or fifty 
bushels of wheat.”134 Ultimately, “Observator” argued that farmers struggled to pay such high 
taxes, especially when Connecticut legislators diminished the money supply. To make matters 
worse, economic output plummeted throughout the War of Independence. Warfare destroyed 
individuals’ property, as well as the labor market’s productivity. As the strife took its toll on 
individuals’ property, and led to many poor farmers and urban mechanics struggling to earn a 
sustainable income, Connecticut’s economic production plunged, and a deflationary economy 
began to coalesce.135 
            Low-to-middle income farmers and mechanics believed that the economic recession of the 
1780s was rooted in the state government’s disruptive economic policies. Taxes, coupled with the 
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shortage of paper money, contributed to the inflated state debts of poverty-stricken, and middling, 
farmers and mechanics. As Holton reveals, by the end of the 1780s, the price of livestock fell by 
roughly half, and land lost around two-thirds of its pre-inflationary worth.136 In addition to the 
currency shortage and the regressive tax system, the issuance of promissory notes, otherwise 
known as Consolidated notes, contributed to the economic slump following the war. State 
governments issued these bonds to colonists who lent money to the states’ legislative bodies for 
the war effort, as well as to army contractors and soldiers. Holton argues that every soldier in the 
Continental Army received part of their compensation in these securities after the state 
governments decided to shrink the supply of specie, beginning in the early-1780s. Unfortunately, 
these bonds were essentially over-valued paper money, and worth only a fraction of their face-
value. While some soldiers held onto these undervalued bonds, a number of Americans sold them 
out of disappointment, intuition, or absolute necessity.137 For example, Joseph Plumb Martin, a 
Connecticut farmer who served throughout the war, indicated in his memoir how disappointed he 
was that his compensation for years of valor were worthless bonds. According to Martin, a number 
of men in his company, including himself, promptly sold these Consolidated notes “to procure 
decent clothing and money sufficient to enable them to pass with decency through the country.”138 
Martin and a number of his comrades realized that the market value of these promissory notes 
were next to nothing, and believed selling the depreciated bonds would generate higher profits 
than holding onto them.    
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            The short supply of specie contributed to more war bond holders speculating in the 
unpredictable Consolidated note market. Ultimately, the Connecticut legislators’ decision to 
continue to “reduce the quantity of the paper medium in circulation” in order to pay back private 
creditors’ debts was counterintuitive. Leonard Richards estimates that approximately two percent 
of Americans owned these bonds by 1790.139 One of the most significant examples of this excess 
speculation in depreciated government paper money was the failed investment partnership between 
General Nathanael Greene and Charles Pettit, a prominent Philadelphia merchant. According to 
Holton, Greene collaborated with Pettit in an investment scheme purchasing $32,000 worth of 
depreciated government securities, following his service as commander of the Southern theater 
from the early-1780s to the end of the war. However, due to the investment’s lackluster return, 
Greene struggled to hold onto the risky securities in the summer of 1784, and eventually sought 
financial assistance from Jeremiah Wadsworth, the former Commissary General of Purchases for 
the Connecticut General Assembly. Wadsworth refused involvement in this speculative 
investment, and Greene allegedly committed suicide over the failed investment. According to a 
letter written by Wadsworth to George Washington in early October 1786, Wadsworth 
acknowledged that Greene’s death was prompted by his “troubles with the crediters of Banks & 
Co,” and that “the General was left liable.”140 Wadsworth’s encounter with Greene’s speculative 
investment revealed that the inflationary economy, coupled with the depreciated market value 
nature of these government securities, was perilous on investors. Despite this, speculation 
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remained rampant due to the short supply of currency. Further, Greene’s failed investment suggests 
that the majority of war debt investments ended up in the hands of a small portion of affluent 
Americans.141    
            As more and more speculators got their hands on these depreciated bonds, state 
legislatures’ imposition of taxes created a dichotomy. While low-income Americans struggled to 
pay taxes due to the short supply of specie in circulation, Consolidated note speculators benefitted 
from state legislatures’ taxes, because they triggered interest payments for these investors. For 
example, according to a January 1783 order, the Connecticut General Assembly enacted a “Tax of 
One Shilling” on the “Polls and rateable Estate of the inhabitants of this State,” and confirmed that 
all of the “Soldiers Notes” would “be received in payment of this tax.”142 The Connecticut 
legislators’ order indicated that taxes improved the speculators’ return on investment through 
interest payments. John Webb, a Connecticut speculator, observed that “our State Notes have 
fallen to four shillings on the pound – oweing to the Assembly’s not laying any Tax of any kind 
this session.”143 Furthermore, in a 1786 letter written to his brother, Samuel, Webb instructed his 
brother to continue purchasing Consolidated notes because the tax increase in Connecticut, “may 
enable me to turn them at 13/4 on the pound.”144 Webb’s correspondences with his brother revealed 
that speculators understood that the market value of the Consolidated notes were positively 
correlated to the state legislators’ securities tax. Yet the low-to-middle income veterans, who sold 
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their consolidated notes, struggled to pay exorbitant taxes in light of the shortage of specie and the 
inflationary economy.  
            Connecticut advocates against the state’s oppressive taxes, and debt-relief legislation, 
blamed poor farmers and urban mechanics’ financial hardships on the state government’s policy 
to tax the citizenry in order to procure interest payments for bondholders. According to a 1786 
article from the Middlesex Gazette, an author who went by the pseudonym, “J” argued that “the 
public securities are so many, that they never can be paid up by taxation or any other way.”145 The 
anonymous author believed that the sheer number of Consolidated notes in circulation encouraged 
speculation. In addition, “J” reasoned that these government securities were “no better on these 
pieces of paper, then was on them bills.”146 The anonymous author believed that the war bond 
initiative was a failure among state legislators and Congressional delegates, because poor farmers 
and urban mechanics struggled to pay the interest-bearing taxes, and the notes did not solve 
America’s massive debt problem.  
            A number of Connecticut residents believed that Governor Trumbull and the Connecticut 
legislators were to blame for the excessive, and unjust, Consolidated note taxes on low-to-middle 
income Americans. In addition, opponents of the state legislature’s oppressive monetary policies 
sympathized with a number of poor veteran farmers and mechanics’ inability to pay off their 
inflated personal, and interest taxes on the securities. In late March 1786, an anonymous author 
wrote a letter to the printers of the Middlesex Gazette discussing his or her opinion on the 
depreciation of the consolidated notes. The writer insisted that this recent economic event has 
 
145 “J – ,” Middlesex Gazette, March 27, 1786, http://infoweb.newsbank.com.providence.idm.oclc.org 
(accessed September 4, 2017). 
 
146 Ibid. 
 
53 
 
 
 
“alarmed the country,” because securities were purchased by speculators from “worthy soldiers” 
at a steep discount. Ultimately, the author argued that the speculators discounted investment 
“undervalued the public credit.” Evidently, most speculators bought the soldiers’ notes “from one 
shilling and six-pence to two shillings and six-pence on the pound,” whereas soldiers purchased 
these securities at “two shillings on the pound.” Furthermore, the writer indicated that “the soldiers 
that sold his notes at under par through necessity,” should seek legal reparations “against the buyer 
for extortion.”147 This critique on the economically disruptive repercussions of securities 
speculation indicated that a number of Connecticut residents were uneasy with low-to-middle 
income veterans’ financial insecurities following the war, and revealed that speculative 
investments only tainted the state’s debt. 
            A number of advocates against the state’s monetary policies believed that Connecticut’s 
legislators should either intervene in the speculators’ investments by reimbursing noteholders at 
market value rather than face value, or eliminate the issuance of the promissory notes.148 However, 
Connecticut’s citizenry were bombarded with more taxes in an effort to drive down the state’s 
domestic debt. For example, the Connecticut legislators instituted a 1783 tax order entitled, “Act 
an Excise on All the Following Articles Sold by Retail or Consumed within the State.” According 
to the tax agenda, a “Gallon of foreign Wine” was taxed one shilling, a “Gallon of West India 
Rum” was taxed six pence, among other retail items. In addition, the legislature levied a tax of 
“five Per Cent on the value thereof in lawful Money,” for civilians who purchased “Iron and Steel 
Ware,” “wrought silks,” among other articles produced in the state.149 The Connecticut legislators’ 
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taxes on foreign imports, as well as domestic goods produced within the state, augmented the 
burdens of a number of poor farmers and urban mechanics, such as the inability to earn an income, 
or pay off their steep debts with creditors. However, some defenders of the Connecticut General 
Assembly’s taxes believed that middling, and poverty-stricken citizens’ financial hardships were 
rooted from their extravagant spending habits, coupled with idleness. For instance, Noah Webster 
wrote an article in late September 1786 for the United States Chronicle under the pseudonym, 
“Tom Thoughtful,” and argued that working class Americans struggled to pay their debts because, 
“luxury rages among you, and luxury is the Devil.”150 Webster myopically argued that day 
laborers’ monetary austerities were attributed to their excessive spending habits, rather than the 
state legislature’s currency quota and its oppressive tax schedule. Some advocates in support of 
the Connecticut legislature’s tight monetary policies believed that the Revolutionary War fueled 
Continental soldiers’ desire to consume more than they could afford. For example, David Daggett, 
an affluent attorney from New Haven, Connecticut, insisted that the war sparked instances of 
“public opinion” that were “erroneous through general ignorance.”151 For Daggett, Webster, and 
other advocates in support of the Connecticut General Assembly’s monetary policies, the excessive 
spending of indebted civilians and impoverished veterans led to their inability to pay off justified 
taxes. 
            While a number of prominent men from elite landholding families supported Connecticut’s 
strict monetary policies, poor farmers and urban mechanics struggled to pay the state legislature’s 
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tariffs, as well as their private taxes, because the General Assembly had depleted the currency in 
circulation. To exacerbate the state’s debt problem, as well as poor farmers and urban mechanics’ 
indigence, Congress authorized a new war bond. On September 27, 1785, the thirteen state 
legislatures received a “requisition” from Congress that sought $3 million from taxpayers for 
foreign debt to Dutch, French, and Spanish loan holders, as well as domestic debt for new officer 
service bonds, Commutation certificates. Congress sought payment of “one year’s interest” for the 
privileged officers who held these high market value bonds, and decided to “apportion to each 
[state] a just quota of the public expenses.”152 The officer bonds came to fruition over some officers 
threatening to commit mutinies among their respective citizenry, neglecting to defend civilians 
from future attacks by marching across the Appalachian Mountains, and even hinting that the state 
legislatures faced the possibility of a military coup.153 Ultimately, Congress reluctantly agreed with 
their demands and authorized officer pensions, which were virtually bonuses worth five years’ 
service.154 According to a resolution passed on May 27, 1778, Congress authorized that the 
“Monthly pay of the officers and soldiers” was to be based on the “rank in the line of the army.”155 
For example, commissioned Colonels received seventy-five dollars per month, commissioned 
Majors received fifty dollars per month, and commissioned Captains received forty dollars per 
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month. Furthermore, the delegates indicated that these rates of payment “formed the basis of the 
settlements with the officers for their Commutation of five years’ full pay.”156 Congress authorized 
another speculative debt instrument with an over-valued face value. As with the Consolidated 
notes, these bonds ended up in the hands of elite landholding Revolutionary war officers, as well 
as in the hands of investors who did not serve. Poor farmers and urban mechanics, continued to 
struggle to pay the Connecticut legislature’s cumbersome poll and property taxes, as well as the 
additional payment for Commutation certificates.157 
            In an effort to raise interest payments for the officers’ payments, Congress’s 1785 
requisition increased the Connecticut citizenry’s tax burden. According to a tax account conducted 
by the Connecticut legislators in October of 1785, each Connecticut town was forced to pay “£39 
8 9 on the six penny Tax on the List 1783,” as well as the sum of “£8 10 3” for the 1784 tax list.158 
A number of low-to-middle income Americans believed their debts derived from speculators on 
these securities. One anti-Commutation activist believed that the Connecticut legislators’ only 
option to save working class Americans from “perpetual taxes” was to reduce the “heavy state debt 
lay upon us for depreciation to officers.”159 According to the anonymous author with the 
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pseudonym, “Agricola,” it would be “impolitic and injurious” if Connecticut’s legislators allowed 
its citizenry to pay interest on officers’ bonds.160 Low-to-middle income workers understood that 
their taxes would drastically increase with the new interest tax for the procurement of 
Commutation bonds. 
            As uproar intensified over the state’s regressive tax system, a number of Continental 
officers publicly disapproved of Congress’s requisition. For example, a Connecticut Courant 
article from May 28, 1787 recorded Charles Burrall and Benjamin Chaplain’s speeches in front of 
the Connecticut House of Representatives on May 15, 1787. Burrall believed that the “people 
ought not to be taxed beyond their abilities.”161 Chaplain insisted that a number of poor farmers 
and mechanics from Windham County, Connecticut were “distressed” over the collection of more 
taxes. Furthermore, Chaplain indicated that a number of farmers already felt the need to “sell off 
their flock, their oxen, and their cows.”162 Because of the social uproar over Commutation 
certificates, the Connecticut House of Representatives dismissed Congress’s requisition in October 
of 1786 on the grounds that Connecticut’s citizenry were “labouring under Embarrasements by 
reason of Arreages of former taxes.”163 Governor Trumbull and the Connecticut legislators could 
not bear to tack on an addition tax to the people. According to Jensen, because liquidity was scare, 
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Commutation certificates continued to be distributed throughout the states. Yet, while the security 
payments were supposed to draw six percent interest for holders, the Confederation Government 
lacked the funds to redeem them.164 In effect, a number of Continental officers sold their 
Commutation certificates in the securities market, and received returns as low as twelve and a half 
cents on the dollar. By the time Congress ratified legislation that sought to redeem these certificates 
on August 4, 1790, speculators possessed the majority of these securities, and many officers 
forfeited their promised returns.165  
            The Connecticut state legislature’s noncompliance with Congress’s 1785 requisition 
eventually led to many officers not receiving their distinguished compensations. While it is 
peculiar that Congress’s bold Commutation strategy faded away, public uproar in Connecticut 
played a major role in the security initiative’s demise. In a letter from Samuel Adams to Noah 
Webster, Adams concluded that the officer corps payment initiative failed because it was “too 
much altercated.”166 In addition to Adams’s deduction, Charles Royster indicates that a number of 
civilians “wanted the officers, like the privates, to return to civilian life inconspicuously,” and 
renounce “invidious claims to have done more, for independence than civilians had done.”167 By 
the end of 1785, support for Congress’s requisition waned as a result of a number of Connecticut 
residents who opposed yet another governmental scheme that hindered ordinary Americans’ 
financial stability, and created unrestrained speculation.       
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            Although Congress’s requisition eventually collapsed, the Connecticut legislators failed to 
understand that heavy tax and debt collection hindered poor farmers and urban mechanics ability 
to work. According to Holton, pro-creditor debt-relief legislations further diminished available 
capital, as well as labor productivity.168 A number of essayists understood this matter, and sought 
to educate Connecticut’s citizenry about why the low-to-middle income Americans, a majority of 
whom served as Continentals, were caught in a financial pitfall. An anonymous author who went 
by the pseudonym, “A Citizen of Connecticut,” wrote an essay in an April 1786 issue of the 
Connecticut Courant that identified that farmers and mechanics suffered more than any other 
socioeconomic group. While “A Citizen of Connecticut,” believed that the “idle and prostrate,” 
were affected by the recession, the author believed that the “industrious laborious farmer,” was far 
more affected by the currency shortage. The author went so far as to reveal that farmers he was 
acquainted with “lost their estates” and persistently struggled to “extricate themselves out of their 
troubles.” Ultimately, this author indicated the discouraged mentality a number of middling, and 
poverty-stricken, farmers and urban mechanics held following the war. 
            Newspaper articles revealed that many Connecticut citizens were agitated with the state 
legislature’s inability either to loosen their strict monetary policies, or combat rampant speculation. 
The state legislature’s poor economic decision making even led to instances of attempted revolt. 
According to the Middlesex Gazette, in November 1786, a group of farmers and artisans in Preston, 
Connecticut were accused by state legislators for conspiring to support Daniel Shays’ insurgency 
in Massachusetts.169 “Zeno,” the author’s alias, believed that the Connecticut legislators’ inability 
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to recognize that low-to-middle income Connecticut civilians could not bear the inflationary 
economy any longer, and that “this most horrid distemper” had the potential to “become 
universal.” Securities speculation and shortsighted debt-relief legislation destroyed labor 
productivity among middling and poverty-stricken citizens. Furthermore, the economic failure of 
the war bond initiatives, and the currency shortage, worsened the financial stability for many 
impoverished veterans, specifically poor farmers and urban mechanics. Regardless of whether or 
not officers or soldiers were commissioned during their service, many veterans from the low-to-
middle income socioeconomic sphere became increasingly indigent from the inflationary 
economic downturn.
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CHAPTER 3: THE ALTERED ‘DEBTS OF HONOUR’ 
 
 
             Many low-to-middle income veterans, specifically poor farmers and mechanics, suffered 
from unequal and inadequate provisions during the war, and then faced the hardships of 
deflationary market forces beginning in the mid-1780s. Yet while many disenfranchised 
Connecticut veterans could not overcome their financial setbacks, entitlements for many 
physically wounded Revolutionary War veterans coalesced beginning in the late-1780s. The first 
instances of military pensions and land benefits stemmed from the ratification of the Bill of Rights 
in the early 1790s. While appealing to state and federal lawmakers became a codified right through 
the First Amendment, the practice of petitioning had been an enduring custom through Anglo legal 
precedent. Through this process, individuals could address their economic, political, and social 
concerns to legislators in order to refine, or create, statutes that ameliorated their grievances.170 
Specifically, the First Amendment documented Americans’ right to petition the United States 
Congress for aid to mend individuals’ debt, trade disputes, poverty, and property damage. In the 
midst of state building, the ratification of the Bill of Rights allowed Americans to play a greater 
role in the legislative process by retaining the affirmative right to state their injustices toward 
legislators, and having the expectation that policymakers were to be receptive to citizens’ 
resentments. In effect, petitioning led to Congress’s commitment to provide entitlements to 
disabled military veterans.171  
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            As the First Congress of the United States preserved its control over assessing personal 
monetary claims, such as financial assistance appeals for poverty, injuries, and debt relief,   
entitlements for disabled veterans were of utmost importance for Congress’s social policy agenda. 
Pensions for disabled veterans struck a nerve with Congress, as it had with the Confederation 
Congress, because, in the majority of instances, physically impaired veterans were unable to work, 
nor able to attain an adequate standard of living.172 Congressional support for disabled veterans’ 
entitlements remained strong throughout the early-nineteenth century. Seth Weed, a Lieutenant 
within Colonel Charles Webbs’ Connecticut Line regiment, benefitted from Congress’s 
preservation of pensions for disabled veterans. According to a letter written by Weed to the Office 
of War Department on January 25, 1819, he was shot by a “musket ball” in his left leg following 
the British Army’s raid on Danbury, Connecticut, during the spring of 1777. Although Weed did 
not indicate when he began receiving payments from the Office of War Department, nor the total 
amount of his entitlement, he revealed that he obtained a payment of $81.60 per year.173 According 
to an 1818 follow-up medical correspondence recorded by Sam Webb and John Auger, two 
surgeons appointed by Pierpont Edwards to assess Weed’s medical state, his wound had turned 
into an infective ulcer. The surgeons noted that Weed was “incapable of procuring” a steady 
income through “manual or bodily labor.”174 Weed was eventually compensated with a large 
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payment of $431.75 on June 25, 1818 for his physical impairments, because Congress decided to 
appropriate more money for the national-level entitlement in 1816.175 On March 8, 1816, Congress 
used a portion of the United States Treasury’s surplus to increase the disabled veterans’ rates 
“according to their ranks and degrees of disabilities.”176 Evidently, the Fourteenth Congress 
continued to provide disabled veterans with comfortable remunerations for their physical 
impairments sustained during the war. Despite Weed’s inability to receive suitable medical 
attention following his injury, he was compensated with an entitlement, because Congress 
supported pensions for disabled veterans.  
            While disabled veterans received remunerations from the Federal Government beginning 
in the late-1780s, service-based pensions remained contentious among legislators since the end of 
the Revolutionary War. Advocates who supported a universal service allotment believed that all 
veterans who could not earn an income to support themselves deserved cash benefits in recognition 
of their service. However, this concept failed to warrant support among Congress because of the 
long-standing rejection by martial leaders of the Revolutionary War, as well as the American 
public. While the Continental Army dealt with desertions during the winter of 1778, primarily 
because of the Continental Army’s inability to provide soldiers with either adequate monthly pay 
or provisions, Washington dismissed service pensions as a feasible option to bolstering soldiers’ 
morale. In November 1777, Washington noted in his personal writings that universal service-based 
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pensions would “give great disgust to the people at large.”177 Washington’s rationale was twofold. 
He believed that service-based pensions were an unnecessary expense that would undoubtedly 
drive up the national debt, and he also believed that service-based pensions would create an 
unwarranted clash among different ranked soldiers, and Americans who did not serve in the state-
funded infantry regiments. For Washington, he believed that many citizens could become alienated 
over an entitlement statute that determined which Americans should receive a greater distinction 
for their martial contributions.178 In terms of the states’ growing debt, Washington argued that 
service entitlements to all soldiers would yield an “enormous expense” that would “add such 
weight to a debt already.”179  
            Despite Washington’s perspective, the onset of Commutation certificates set off a series of 
dissensions between the public and the soldiers over social and economic standing. As officers 
demanded pension payments for their service, debate over the justness of the Commutation notes 
brought about clashes between socioeconomic classes. While Continental officers demanded 
entitlements from the Federal Government because they claimed their financial insecurities 
stemmed from the war, these contentions only heightened the unjust notion that remunerations 
depended on soldiers’ rank, as well as their social and economic status. Furthermore, the discord 
over the Commutation notes worsened impoverished soldiers’ ability to receive pensions, because 
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veterans’ social distinctions had become an integral component in determining who could receive 
remunerations for service.180       
            When President James Monroe took office in 1817, however, Congress devised a robust 
social program act that looked to compensate indigent Revolutionary War veterans with monthly 
pension payments. For a number of low-to-middle income veterans, hope was restored. According 
to Jensen, because Monroe served as a Revolutionary officer, he encouraged Congress to construct 
a service pension proposal that would ameliorate financial instabilities for all surviving officers 
and soldiers.181 Monroe clarified that since the ratification of the United States Constitution in 
1789, the democratic republic had created “profitable commerce,” and “an extraordinary 
elevation” in public credit. However, in the wake of settling a significant amount of the United 
States’ outstanding public debts, Monroe addressed the sad truth that surviving Revolutionary 
veterans “were reduced to indigence, and even to real distress.”182 Although Monroe believed “that 
the number to be benefitted by any provision” would not be large because the war ended more than 
three decades ago, he believed service payments to surviving veterans would “do honor to their 
country to provide for them.”183 After months of legislative jockeying among supporters and 
opponents of Monroe’s universal service pension program, a compromised version became law on 
March 18, 1818.184 According to the new entitlement law, men who served in the Continental 
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Army or Navy for at least nine months were entitled to receive pensions if they could demonstrate 
their “reduced circumstances in life.”185 Unlike Monroe’s vision, the law gave the Office of War 
Department’s administrators the authority to accept or dismiss an applicant’s declaration for a 
pension. Due to these procedural guidelines, a number of administrators selectively assessed 
applicants’ financial worth and the extent of their poverty. 
            While Monroe hoped that the Federal Government could bestow pensions to all aged and 
poverty-stricken veterans, the Pension Act of 1818’s guidelines exposed social and economic 
disparity in the Continental Army. The Office of War Department’s inequitable remunerations 
greatly affected poor farmers and urban mechanics who served in the Connecticut Line. Although 
Jensen indicates that the Pension Act of 1818 was a watershed moment for domestic social 
policymaking, she argues that the entitlement program’s rigid eligibility structure encouraged self-
interest and elitism to play a dominant role in applicants’ assessments.186 One of the most 
significant problems with the Office of War Department’s pension assessment process was that it 
lacked an objective analysis of an applicant’s financial state. Ultimately, the Office of War 
Department’s administrators verified whether or not a petitioner legitimately served for more than 
nine months and determined the total amount to be paid to the petitioner based on their recorded 
income disparity, and infirmities. In addition, administrators for the Office of War Department did 
not evaluate applicants on an impartial case-by-case basis. Instead of carefully assessing a 
petitioner’s income disparity in relation to their demographic standing, the administrators 
evaluated its applicants on their written declarations that included the value of their possessions, 
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as well as why they required an entitlement from the Federal Government. Secretary of War John 
Calhoun, who oversaw the entitlement program, admitted to Joseph Bloomfield, the Chairman of 
the Committee on Revolutionary Pensions for Congress, that the pension assessors had made a 
number of “impositions or mistakes” in payment amounts due to the growing number of applicants. 
Despite the program’s “strict construction,” Calhoun revealed that the entitlement act had “been 
less successfully executed” in improving beneficiaries’ “condition in life, as to property.”187 
Furthermore, according to unrevealed sources, Calhoun disclosed that “many of the pensioners” 
hailed from “more affluent circumstances than that which the act contemplated.”188 By not 
assessing veterans’ financial insecurities on a case-by-case basis, assessors bestowed inequitable 
payments to a number of pension applicants.  
            Reports trickling out of the Office of War Department that some petitioners fared better 
than others who were thought to be more deserving shocked Connecticut residents. For example, 
on July 16, 1818, the Middlesex Gazette published a letter written by Henry Shaw that chastised 
the pension assessors’ inability to objectively examine veterans’ dire need of assistance. The 
Congressman from Berkshire, Massachusetts believed that this issue was a “severe injustice” 
toward the “venerable, but indigent Soldier.”189 In the same issue of the Middlesex Gazette, the 
town’s clerk published the proceedings from the Middletown town meeting on December 6, 1819. 
A number of Middletown residents criticized veterans of “affluent circumstances” distastefully 
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seeking entitlements from the Federal Government. Elisha Coe, the moderator at the town meeting, 
encouraged the Middletown citizenry to report any information of this fraudulent activity to the 
town’s political leaders. Although Calhoun had made it clear that he would eradicate all 
entitlements made to more well off pensioners by re-assessing beneficiaries’ degree of financial 
instability, a number of Connecticut veterans suffered from the administrators’ payment 
discrepancies.190 
            The fragmented nature of the entitlement program encouraged administrators to make 
payment decisions based on preferences.191 For example, on April 17, 1818, the Office of War 
Department began to remunerate Elias Stevens, a Connecticut veteran from Killingworth who 
served as a private for three years in a regiment commanded by Colonel Heman Swift. According 
to Stevens’ file, he received a pension payment for four consecutive months that totaled $36.80, 
until the Office of War Department asked him to testify before a local district judge in order to 
continue to receive the Federal Government’s entitlement.192 However, on June 14, 1820, Stevens 
gave his declaration of need to the Middlesex County Court’s Clerk, and presented an upscale 
asset schedule that totaled $705.50 (see Table 1). According to his testimony, Stevens insisted that 
“lameness and rheumatism” prevented him from blacksmithing, a trade that he had performed for 
more than thirty years. However, his assets revealed that Stevens owned one “house barn,” and 
“two-thirds of an old house and barn” situated on close to seventy-three acres of land. In addition 
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to these possessions, Stevens owned more than twenty animals, including horses, oxen, and sheep, 
as well as furnished items such as a “Bureau” and a “Bookcase.”193 After the Middlesex County 
Court examined Stevens’ testimony and asset schedule, Stevens received a letter from the Office 
of War Department on July 8, 1820 informing him that “on account of the amount of your 
property,” his name was “stricken from the Pension List.”194 Stevens’ ability to receive a pension 
from the Office of War Department, given the extent of his possessions, indicated that the Pension 
Act of 1818 created inequitable remunerations among the applicant pool. 
            The significance of Stevens’ payment undermined the original purpose of the service 
pension program. Rather than relieving impoverished veterans’ financial instabilities, the Office 
of War Department’s payments to Stevens reveals social and economic divisions that existed in 
the Connecticut Line, as well as the preferential nature of the service entitlement program. On July 
4, 1820, George Batterson, a sixty-three year old veteran from Warren, Connecticut filed an 
affidavit with the Litchfield County Court. According to Batterson’s declaration, he also served in 
the regiment commanded by Colonel Heman Swift for three years beginning in 1781. Batterson 
informed Frederick Wolcott, the court’s clerk, that he was a blacksmith by trade, but “unable to 
work at his trade for several years” due to a “Rheumatic Affection.” Batterson later admitted in 
his declaration that he had “no hope of being able to work [as a blacksmith] again.”195 A valuation 
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of his possessions of “one house on [the] highway,” “one cow,” among other basic household 
items brought the total value of his possessions to $57.85. Clearly, the Office of War Department’s 
entitlement to Batterson of $35.78 on April 21, 1818 was of little assistance (see Table 1). 
Batterson’s financial situation indicated the poverty trap a number of working class Connecticut 
veterans experienced following the war. In addition, a comparison between Batterson’s financial 
difficulties and Stevens’ means revealed an example of the Office of War Department’s inequitable 
payments to Revolutionary War veterans.196 
            Although Batterson and Stevens both served for three years as non-commissioned privates, 
Stevens received a greater entitlement payment than Batterson. If the total value of Stevens’ assets 
were $647.65 greater than Battersons’ assets, why was he compensated more than Batterson (see 
Table 1)? The Office of War Department’s miscalculations led to this payment discrepancy. The 
pension program’s improper assessment strategies enabled the assessors to make errors due to the 
overwhelming number of applicants.197 In Connecticut alone, the Office of War Department 
compensated 1,373 veterans between 1818 and 1820. Approximately 8,398 pension recipients 
resided in New England. These statistics revealed that the sheer number of applicants created a 
sizable room for error in determining payment amounts.198 Furthermore, the financial contrast 
between the two men indicated that the pension assessors incorporated the social and economic 
standing of Batterson, and Stevens in their payment decision.   
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            Despite striking differences in soldiers’ value of assets, pension assessors placed a far 
greater emphasis on social and economic standing, rather than proven indigence, in their 
remunerations to veterans. Pension payments among working class Connecticut veterans, as 
displayed in Table 1, were skewed. This division was particularly true for applicants that indicated 
they were “day laborers,” by occupation. An aggregation of thirty-four Connecticut veterans’ 
pension records, filed throughout the state, illustrates the extent of the social and economic 
divisions among Connecticut’s surviving veterans from 1818 to 1820. On March 10, 1819, Edward 
Fuller, a resident of Norfolk, began receiving a monthly entitlement of $8. In total, he would 
receive $46.70 from the Office of War Department.199 As a private who served for one year in a 
regiment commanded by Colonel Charles Burrel, Fuller’s financial instability following the war 
was at the lowest-tier of the aggregation (see Table 1). According to an affidavit presented to the 
Litchfield County Court on July 5, 1820, Fuller testified in front of the Honorable Frederick 
Wolcott that the entitlement package he received from the Federal Government was insufficient in 
relieving his destitution. “I have no property [whatsoever],” stated Fuller. While neither Wolcott 
nor Fuller provided an explanation for his poverty, private debts and the state’s exorbitant taxes 
most likely contributed to his “total amount in value of property” of zero dollars.200 
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Table 1: Payments to Connecticut Veteran Applicants following the Pension Act of 1818 
a 
Occupations of one: carpenter, merchant, seaman, tailor        
            Fuller’s affidavit revealed that his age, and potential physical impediments, led to his 
inability to earn an income as a day laborer and to be self-sufficient. While the United States 
Bureau of Labor Statistics did not accurately track unemployment rates prior to 1890, census data 
reveals the extent of the labor productivity pitfall in 1820. While the population of Connecticut in 
1820 was approximately 275,000, ninety-two percent of the state’s population resided in rural 
Connecticut, while 21,000 individuals resided in cities, towns, and villages.201 In 1820, 
approximately 17% of the Connecticut population was made up of residents aged forty-five years 
and older. Although the census did not have accurate projections to determine the number of 
workers able to earn an income, the report indicated that one percent of the state’s population was 
a part of the labor force in 1820.202 While statistical inaccuracies need to be taken into 
consideration, the data reveals how the labor market shortage contributed to the impoverishment 
 
201 Ben J. Wattenberg, The Statistical History of the United States: From Colonial Times to the Present, 
(New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers), 1976, 25. 
 
202 Ibid., 134. 
 
Occupation Number of 
Applicants 
% of Pension 
Applicants 
Number of Years 
in Service  
Total 
Payment 
Range ($) 
Total Value of 
Assets ($) 
Blacksmith 2 6.25 3.00 35.78 - 36.80 57.85 - 705.50 
Day Laborer 7 21.88 0.75 - 6.00 37.60 - 137.54 0 - 282.48 
Sawyer 2 6.25 0.75 - 1.00 88.80 - 121.30 87.95 - 159.85 
Farmer 11 34.38 0.85 - 6.00 35.73 - 184.53 0 - 281.30 
Shoemaker 3 9.38 1.00 - 6.00 37.33 - 138.58 76.25 - 382.07 
Laborer  3 9.38 3.00 - 6.00 37.60 - 135.69 0 - 68.77 
Occupations 
of one 
4 12.50 0.75 - 6.00 67.00 - 216.00 14.00 - 65.50 
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of many Connecticut veterans. On April 22, 1818, Henry Baldwin, a resident of Cornwall, started 
to receive a monthly payment of $8, which would amount to $83.47. Baldwin served for nine 
months in a company commanded by Captain Edward Shipman.203 On July 4, 1820, Baldwin, a 
sixty-eight- year-old ex-soldier for the Connecticut Line, appeared before the Litchfield County 
Court’s administrators to present a declaration toward the entitlement he received from the Office 
of War Department, as well as a schedule of his assets valued at $93.68 (see Table 1).204 
            With passage of the Federal Pension Act of 1818, the Office of War Department required 
all local county court administrators to assess the value of the applicants’ possessions. A valuation 
of an applicant’s assets revealed more about their finances, labor productivity, and social status in 
the wake of the recession of the 1780s than a single paragraph that outlined their declaration for 
financial support. After revealing that he worked as a day laborer “but a small part of the time,” 
Baldwin confessed that he could not perform steady labor on account of his health. In addition, the 
fact that his sixty-one-year-old wife could only perform “very light work,” indicated that Baldwin 
and his wife were not able to work sustainably, nor earn incomes. Yet, Baldwin’s asset schedule 
revealed the extent of his financial instability. Baldwin’s possessions included two cows, one calf, 
three young cattle, a wagon and harness for a horse, among other agricultural assets.205 The issue 
with Baldwin’s financial state was twofold. First, the schedule did not indicate that he owned any 
land. Second, the majority of Baldwin’s assets were static in that he was not able to grow the value 
 
203 “Pension File of Henry Baldwin, April 22, 1818,” Revolutionary War Pension and Bounty-Land 
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of furniture or agricultural tools without costs of repair. Yet, at the end of his valuation, Baldwin 
stated that he was “indebted and owe[d] eighty dollars.” While Baldwin did not explicitly reveal 
the source of his indebtedness in the affidavit, the number of household assets suggests that 
Baldwin rented property and became indebted to a Cornwall landowner. Regardless of what 
actually caused his arrears, the fact that Baldwin’s debt was $3.47 lower than the payment he 
received from the Office of the War Department brings to question how the department’s 
administrators arrived at the total entitlement payments to selected applicants.206 Ultimately, the 
Office of War Department did not have a standard algorithm that determined which applicant 
received how much in remunerations from the Federal Government. Rather, entitlement packages 
were determined at the discretion of administrators’ selection.207  
            Baldwin and his wife’s inability to work caused their financial despondence. However, a 
comparison between Baldwin and Edward Fuller reveals another example of the perplexing 
discrepancies in Connecticut veterans’ pension payments. Baldwin’s asset schedule revealed that 
he did not have the financial means of Elisa Stevens. However, in terms of asset schedule 
valuation, Fuller was far more impoverished than Baldwin. Despite Fuller’s total asset value of 
zero dollars, Baldwin received an entitlement that was $36.77 more than Fuller’s total payment of 
$46.70 (see Table 1). Ultimately, a comparison between these two men unveils pension assessors’ 
inability to evaluate the claimants’ needs, as well as the assessors’ impartial remunerations based 
on applicants’ social and economic standings. Fuller served as a Continental private for three more 
months than Baldwin’s nine month service tenure. While Congress’s service legislation intended 
 
206 “Henry Baldwin Affidavit to Superior County Court of Litchfield, July 4, 1820,” Litchfield County 
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to entitle veterans who served for a minimum of nine months “in need of assistance from his 
country for support,” the payment discrepancy between Baldwin and Fuller was clear.208 This 
deviation in aid brought out the social and economic contrast of the state’s Continental Army, as 
well as the extent of the wealth gap among patriot beneficiaries.  
            The entitlements were not determined by years of service, extent of poverty, physical or 
health impediments, among other quantitative variables. Rather, discrepancies in pay emerged 
from the War Department administrators’ counterintuitive assessment strategies. Whether or not 
the differences in payments arose from mere error, the imbalance of payments brought out 
Connecticut veterans’ social and economic disparities. Pension records for surviving veterans 
reinforced the extent of the Connecticut Line’s stark wealth gap. An aggregation of twenty-seven 
Connecticut privates revealed extensive payment discrepancies. Among the population of privates, 
remunerations were irregular in that the payments did not correlate with financial instability and 
service tenure (see Table 2). For instance, Gideon Goff, a day laborer from Wethersfield, received 
$37.60. According to his April 1818 affidavit, Goff served six years in a company commanded by 
Captain Edward Buckley until he was “honorably discharged at West Point” on June 9, 1783.209 
Despite his honorable service tenure, an assessment of Goff’s asset schedule on August 1, 1820 
revealed that the total value of the fifty-nine year old’s possessions stood at $282.48, and included 
a “dwelling House and Barn” valued at $200. While Goff’s asset schedule, which included 
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livestock and various household items, did not suggest that he was affluent, the amount he received 
in entitlements is puzzling when stacked up against his fellow Connecticut applicants.210  
Table 2: Payments to Privates in the Connecticut Line following the Pension Act of 1818 
 
            Length of service did not entitle a surviving veteran to greater financial aid. Congress’s 
Pension Act of 1818 did not state that any variable applied to the amount of veterans’ entitlements 
besides being in “reduced circumstances in life.”211 Goff received the same payment as a 
Wethersfield laborer whose asset schedule amounted to zero dollars. Justus Blinn served for three 
years in the same company as Goff, and received the same amount as Goff from the Office of War 
Department in April of 1818.212 Yet, according to an affidavit recorded by the Hartford County 
Court on August 1, 1820, Blinn was indigent. At seventy-three years old, the Hartford County 
Court administrators valued Blinn’s asset schedule at zero dollars (see Table 2). Blinn revealed 
that he was unable to work on account of his health, he had “no property except necessary beddings 
 
210 “Gideon Goff Affidavit to Hartford County Court, August 21, 1820,” Revolutionary War Pension and 
Bounty-Land Warrant Application Files, (NARA microfilm publication M804, 2,670 rolls), Records of the 
Department of Veterans Affairs, Record Group 15, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (accessed 
www.ancestry.com on August 31, 2017). 
 
211 “An Act to Provide for Certain Persons Engaged in the Land and Naval Service of the United States in 
the Revolutionary War, March 18, 1818,” in The Pension Laws of the United States, ed. Mayo, 107-108. 
 
212 “Pension File of Justus Blinn, April 14, 1818,” Revolutionary War Pension and Bounty-Land Warrant 
Application Files, (NARA microfilm publication M804, 2,670 rolls), Records of the Department of Veterans 
Affairs, Record Group 15, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (accessed www.ancestry.com on August 31, 2017). 
Number of 
Applicants 
% of Pension 
Applicants 
Number 
of Years 
in Service 
Total 
Payment 
Range ($) 
Total Value of Assets ($) 
10 37.04 0 - 1.99 35.73 - 184.53 0 - 159.85 
11 40.74 2 - 3.99 35.78 - 137.55 0 - 705.50 
6 22.22 4 - 6 37.60 - 137.54 13.24 - 282.48 
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and clothing,” and that he had “no dependence for support except charity.”213 In light of Blinn’s 
oath, as well as his idle asset schedule, the Federal Government rewarded Goff the same amount 
as Blinn. Rather than objectively examining both applicants, the Office of War Department’s 
assessment procedure did not justly recompense a number of veterans.  
            Pension payments were skewed among surviving privates of the Connecticut Line. 
Beneficiaries’ affidavits and asset valuations showcased the Office of War Departments’ partial 
assessment strategies in bestowing just remunerations to veterans in financial despair. In addition 
to Connecticut privates, an aggregation of seven surviving officers revealed less drastic, yet 
notable payment inequities. For instance, John Bulkeley, a mariner from Lyme, received a total 
entitlement of $98.00.214 According to an affidavit recorded by the New London County Court on 
June 27, 1820, Bulkeley served for five years as a lieutenant in a regiment commanded by Colonel 
Andrew Ward. Despite his service in the Connecticut Line’s officer corps, an assessment of 
Bulkeley’s asset schedule, totaled at $45.00, indicated that the seventy-six year old veteran had 
little means, and that he was incapable of earning a steady income (see Table 2). On June 27, 1820, 
the New London County Court’s assessment of Bulkeley’s asset schedule revealed that he owned 
“50 acres of rough poor land lying in the North part of Lyme,” forty dollars’ worth of “notes and 
money,” among other possessions, such as a gun and a crop saw. Bulkeley declared that he was 
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unable to work on account of his “age, a rupture, and other infirmities.”215 Although Bulkeley had 
never been married, he disclosed that following the death of his sister, he had been living with a 
man who was previously married to one of his nieces. Bulkeley’s written declaration and asset 
schedule, like so many others, exposed that the Federal Government’s entitlement insufficiently 
improved his social and economic livelihood. 
            Following the abatement of Commutation certificates, due to the incalculable specie value 
of the notes, many low-to-middle income officers could not escape the recession brought about by 
the war. Due to the labor market’s shortage in Connecticut, a number of officers were pressed to 
find work in conjunction with paying off public and private debts, as well as battling deflated 
prices on goods and services. However, the formation of the Ohio Company, a land speculation 
business organized to help colonists buy property in the Ohio River Valley, enabled officers to 
purchase property by exchanging their unpredictable securities for land. In May of 1787, Congress 
arranged for the sale of 1.5 million acres in the Northwest Territory to the Ohio Company for one 
million dollars in securities at par value.216 While this opportunity was a case of noblesse oblige, 
officers who had already sold their securities, or did not have the desire to leave their communities, 
did not receive an opportunity for financial assistance until the Pension Act of 1818. Samuel Gibbs, 
a merchant from Norwalk, received a total entitlement of $216.00.217 According to an affidavit 
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recorded by the Fairfield County Court on July 25, 1820, Gibbs served for six years in a regiment 
commanded by Colonel Samuel Wyllys. The court administrators determined that the total value 
of the sixty-three-year-old’s assets stood at $47.86, and included six “Windsor chairs,” two “old 
tables,” six “earthen plates,” as well as an ox, three swine, and a cow (see Table 2). Although 
Gibbs’ possessions did not translate to affluence, the amount he received from the Office of War 
Department begs the question as to why he was entitled to such a large payment in comparison to 
his fellow Connecticut Continental officers.218          
            The Office of War Department’s impartial assessment of applicants’ financial sufferings 
led to inequitable remunerations among the Connecticut Line’s surviving officers. Although the 
value of Gibbs’ assets were $2.86 higher than the market price of Bulkeley’s possessions, Gibbs 
received an entitlement worth $118 more than Bulkeley (see Table 2). While Bulkeley’s and 
Gibbs’ asset valuations were relatively similar, a comparison between their declarations for 
assistance as well as their possessions indicates that Bulkeley should have received a greater 
entitlement from the Federal Government. While Bulkeley resided on several acres, his other assets 
suggested that the land was not feasible for cultivation, dwelling developments, nor readily 
accessible to the maritime commerce community along Long Island Sound. Bulkeley’s age and 
physical impairments prevented him from earning an income or escaping his indigence.219 On the 
contrary, Gibbs’ financial despair seems to have stemmed from speculative business dealings. 
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According to Gibbs’ affidavit, his indebtedness was due to “an unexpected series of misfortune.” 
Gibbs went on to state that in order to come to terms with his business creditors, he “resigned the 
whole of my property into their hands.”220 Despite the different paths that led to their poverty, a 
comparison between Blakeley and Gibbs reveals a stark payment discrepancy. Furthermore, this 
example of inequitable entitlements signaled that the Office of War Department’s assessment 
strategy was incalculable. Because assessors did not properly determine the extent of applicants’ 
poverty, and the degree of their financial despair, the Federal Government created a hollow, and a 
partial way toward assessing veterans’ needs.  
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AFTERWORD 
 
 
            When the Battle of Lexington and Concord erupted in 1775, many wealthy landholding 
men, such as Samuel Holden Parsons, believed that their social standing and political relationships 
would enable them to quickly ascend to leadership positions in the Continental Army. Parsons, a 
Harvard-educated delegate of the Connecticut General Assembly used his political network to his 
advantage and became a Major-General for the Connecticut Line in less than five years after he 
was appointed a Brigadier-General in August 1776. While Parsons had no military experience, his 
wealth and his Harvard colleagues, particularly John Adams, paved the way for his success.221 On 
the contrary, a number of indigent citizens, such as Aaron Austin, enlisted not on the desire to 
elevate their social status, but to take up arms for expectations of financial stability and communal 
safety. While poverty-stricken farmers and mechanics undoubtedly feared that by joining the 
Continental Army they could jeopardize the well-being of their families and their financial 
security, men like Austin believed their service led to compensations in property, goods, and 
money. Yet, for many, service brought indigence. A close examination of Connecticut soldiers’ 
affidavits, asset valuations, and pension records exemplified the Connecticut Line’s social and 
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wealth disparities. Case study comparisons among poor farmers and urban mechanics brings to 
question whether or not a number of beneficiaries’ entitlements were really worth the price of their 
blood. In a way, the inconsistencies among service entitlements personified the extent of the 
public’s wealth gap, and the social and economic imbalances between the haves and the have-nots 
during the Revolution. An evaluation of the Connecticut Line’s social and economic diversity 
allowed for a closer look at these inequities.  
            During the war, not all Connecticut soldiers received the same provisions as others. Joseph 
Plumb Martin chronicled how commanders did not equitably distribute clothing, food, and 
payments among enlisted men. While the Connecticut Line’s commanders promised soldiers 
rations of meat, flour, garments, and specie, Martin noted that many enlistees, himself included, 
never received these assurances.222 To make matters worse, all soldiers did not receive necessary 
medical treatment. Dr. Albigence Waldo’s journal entries revealed that many soldiers’ sufferings 
were undeserved, because a number of the Connecticut Line’s commanders improperly controlled 
the treatment of wounds and the prevention of contagious illnesses, such as smallpox. From 1775 
to 1782, Continentals were vulnerable to a smallpox epidemic due to the fact that a majority did 
not know how to prevent the spread of viral infections without proper medical prevention.223 In 
conjunction with commanders’ skewed material rationing techniques, medical inequities deprived 
many soldiers. 
            As peace with Britain started to become a reality, many poor farmers and urban mechanics 
struggled to escape poverty, a tight labor market, and persistent deflation. While state legislatures 
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attempted to ameliorate private creditors’ debt burdens, droves of impoverished veterans were 
forgotten. The lack of specie in circulation led a number of Connecticut veterans to sell 
preemptively under-valued government bonds to profit-hungry speculators. To augment the 
Connecticut state legislature’s abrupt attempt at monetary contraction, the state’s regressive tax 
system inflated ordinary Americans’ debts. As consumer purchasing power contracted, and 
deflation persisted, a number of poor farmers and urban mechanics descended into further 
impoverishment, and failed to receive any financial support until the passage of the Federal 
Pension Act of 1818. And while the Commutation Act eventually failed, Congress’s haphazard 
effort to allocate service payments only to Continental officers brought social standing into the 
limelight for future entitlement statutes.224 Following the ratification of the Revolutionary 
entitlement legislation, men like Edward Fuller and Justus Blinn proved their poverty, under oath, 
in written testimony that discussed their poor health and economic instability. Yet these men, along 
with many others, received insufficient payments for their services due to assessors’ inability to 
properly evaluate their needs, and understand their deserved remunerations.      
           An aggregation of thirty-six Connecticut Continentals’ pension records reveal that the 
Office of War Department failed to properly allocate entitlements to the elderly, indigent farmers 
and urban mechanics. While the public assistance legislation for aged and impoverished veterans 
was unprecedented, the execution of the act was partial in that a number of the most poverty-
stricken beneficiaries received insubstantial benefits. Following the passage of the 1818 
entitlement legislation and the apparent inequities among recipients, Congressional delegates 
debated whether or not Revolutionary veterans’ pensions should be interpreted by policymakers 
as a legally binding debt, or munificence. In a speech to Congress on April 1, 1820, New 
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Hampshire Representative Clifton Clagett appealed to his fellow Congressmen concerning this 
quandary. Regardless of whether or not they believed a soldier’s pension was a legally binding 
contract that had to be properly indemnified by the Federal Government, Clagett argued that a 
veteran had “a vested right in his pension for life.”225 While a number of surviving soldiers 
persistently demanded more substantial payments, and many Congressional delegates advocated 
that service pensions should be interpreted as a contractual obligation with surviving veterans, 
revisions to the 1818 act failed in large part due to the Panic of 1819 and growing sectional 
politics.226 Eventually, in May 1828, a divided Congress ratified the Pension Act of 1828, a 
revision of the 1818 statute that authorized full pay for life to surviving officers and soldiers. This 
new statute did not require applicants to demonstrate poverty, and entrusted the allocation of 
benefits from the Office of War Department to the Treasury Department.227 Despite these 
legislative efforts to bestow more equitable entitlements among surviving Continentals, 
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Congressional delegates failed to create a just entitlement program for nearly forty-five years after 
the Revolutionary War. 
            The Office of War Department’s inability to objectively assess applicants’ degree of 
financial indigence led to middling men like Elias Stevens receiving greater pension payments 
than impoverished veterans, such as George Batterson. Men like Batterson suffered far more than 
Stevens from inflationary market forces, and the lack of financial assistance. By the time Congress 
devised a service entitlement act that sought to compensate soldiers for the remainder of their lives, 
without demonstrating the extent of their poverty through asset valuations, the majority of poverty-
stricken farmers and mechanics neared the end of their lives.  
            Yet, despite the fact that the total expenditure for this social policy was estimated at 
$5,368,275 by start of 1833, Congress continued to expand the entitlement legislation to widows, 
and eventually orphans.228 On May 2, 1850, Lucy Clewley Martin, the widow of Joseph Plumb 
Martin, started to receive a payment of $96 per year from the Department of Treasury. According 
to her pension record file, monthly payments of $8 arrived at her residence in Belfast, Maine until 
her death on April 30, 1857. A closer look at Joseph Plumb Martin’s 1820 affidavit allows for a 
careful analysis as to whether or not Lucy’s entitlement was adequate. Prior to appearing in court 
to receive a service pension, Martin voyaged to Maine and was one of the first settlers of Prospect. 
After entering into a land dispute battle with Henry Knox, the first Secretary of War, Martin was 
unable to pay a land appraisal, and eventually fell into financial despair.229 On July 7, 1820, Martin 
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appeared before the County Court of Hancock, and stated that he had “no real nor personal estate 
nor any income [whatsoever].”230 Besides his “necessary bedding and wearing apparel,” two cows, 
six sheep, and one pig, the sixty-year old did not have any other possessions. Ultimately, the court 
administrators valued Martin’s assets at $52. Because of his age, and his “infirmity,” Martin was 
unable to earn a living as a farmer, support his “sickly and rheumatic” wife, nor look after his five 
children. While Martin could have hoped for a monthly entitlement sum greater than $8, he was 
grateful for the service payment granted by the Office of War Department, and stated that the 
entitlement allowed him to provide more support for himself and his family.231   
            On September 3, 1850, the seventy-four year old widow appeared before Honorable Joseph 
Miller, probate judge for Waldo County, and sought to receive a widowhood pension. On July 29, 
1848, Congress enacted legislation that sought to recompense “the widows of all officers, non-
commissioned officers, musicians, soldiers, mariners, or marines, and Indian spies” who served in 
the Revolutionary War. According to the statute, a widow could legally receive her deceased 
husband’s monthly payment.232 Lucy received a per annum payment of $96 from 1850 until her 
death in 1857. While there are no personal records of Lucy’s experience as a pension recipient, 
her determination to meet with the Probate Judge for Waldo County and activate her entitlement 
claim revealed that her family’s stability depended on her husband’s pension. By receiving the 
same pension rate as her deceased husband, perhaps Lucy was able to receive some short-term 
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relief for her rheumatism, as well as protect her children if they were to fall into financial 
despair.233  
            Despite this unprecedented revision to the United States’ social policy legislation for 
Revolutionary veterans, it is difficult to dismiss the fact that these entitlements were far overdue. 
In addition to the inequitable allocation shortcomings of the Pension Act of 1818, legislators 
neglected the financial state of many ordinary Americans in order to secure economic and political 
sovereignty. State legislatures, and the Continental Congress, struggled to pay for the war against 
Great Britain due to the lack of domestic and private creditors, as well as the existence of no 
domestic banks. The Continental Congress’s introduction of paper money, known as 
“continentals,” in 1774 allowed state legislators to rely on a fiat currency to stimulate commerce, 
and as a microcredit mechanism to tax colonists indirectly.234 However, the value of paper money 
degraded. Due to early British victories along the Hudson Valley in 1776, many citizens lost 
confidence in this paper money and believed that specie was a more dependable, yet scarce, 
medium of exchange. In an effort to impede the hyperinflation caused by the continual issuance of 
continentals in circulation, Congressional delegates and state legislators eventually restricted the 
supply of fiat currency to pay off the war debts. However, legislators’ reduction of bills of credit 
brought on regressive taxes, unyielding deflation, and an undependable medium of exchange.235 
As specie remained scarce throughout the late-eighteenth century, a number of low-to-middle 
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income Connecticut veterans faced unsettling tax burdens. Despite Congressional efforts to restore 
the nation’s public credit, many poor farmers and urban mechanics struggled to escape the 
Continental Army’s skewed rationing techniques, a debilitating recession, and entitlement 
inequities. While the Federal Government eventually established a banking system that allowed 
the United States to build its economy, a number of impoverished farmers, blacksmiths, and day 
laborers, remained neglected.        
 
 
 
 
